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ABSTRACT
SAID M. MAROUF. Clustering and recommendation techniques for access control policy
management. (Under the direction of DR. MOHAMED SHEHAB)
Managing access control policies can be a daunting process,given the frequent policy
decisions that need to be made, and the potentially large number of policy rules involved.
Policy management includes, but is not limited to: policy optimization, configuration, and
analysis. Such tasks require a deep understanding of the policy and its building compo-
nents, especially in scenarios where it frequently changesand needs to adapt to different
environments. Assisting both administrators and users in performing these tasks is impor-
tant in avoiding policy misconfigurations and ill-informedpolicy decisions. We investigate
a number of clustering and recommendation techniques, and implement a set of tools that
assist administrators and users in managing their policies. First, we propose and imple-
ment an optimization technique, based on policy clusteringa d adaptable rule ranking, to
achieve optimal request evaluation performance. Second, we implement a policy analysis
framework that simplifies and visualizes analysis results,based on a hierarchical cluster-
ing algorithm. The framework utilizes a similarity-based model that provides a basis of
risk analysis on newly introduced policy rules. In additiont administrators, we focus on
regular individuals whom nowadays manage their own access control polices on a regular
basis. Users are making frequent policy decisions, especially with the increasing popular-
ity of social network sites, such as Facebook and Twitter. Foexample, users are required
to allow/deny access to their private data on social sites each time they install a 3rd party
application. To make matters worse, 3rd party access requests are mostly uncustomizable
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by the user. We propose a framework that allows users to customize their policy decisions
on social sites, and provides a set of recommendations that assist users in making well-
informed decisions. Finally, as the browser has become the main edium for the users
online presence, we investigate the access control models for 3rd party browser extensions.
Even though, extensions enrich the browsing experience of users, they could potentially
represent a threat to their privacy. We propose and implement a framework that 1) mon-
itors 3rd party extension accesses, 2) provides fine-grained permission controls, and 3)
Provides detailed permission information to users in effort to increase their privacy aware-
ness. To evaluate the framework we conducted a within-subjects user study and found the
framework to effectively increase user awareness of requested permissions.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Managing access control policies is a complex process, given the complex nature of pol-
icy languages and the large number of attributes and rules involved. Policies can involve
thousands of rules, leading to thousands of relations amongp licy attributes. Interpret-
ing and understanding such a large number of relations is difficult, and the possibilities
of introducing policy misconfigurations is high. Another issue with large policies, is the
difficulty in optimizing them for optimal performance, thatis, if policy rules are configured
properly, potential performance bottlenecks can be removed. Adding to this complexity, is
the fact that not all administrators are well versed and proficient in all access control policy
languages. For example, a Linux-based server could incorporate both an operating system
(OS) level policy using SELinux [60], and a web service levelpolicy using XACML [49].
Both policies can easily involve tens of thousands of rules and ttributes, which makes
it difficult for average administrators to manage without appropriate policy management
tools.
Access control policy management is no longer a task strictly assigned to administrators.
Nowadays, with the increase in privacy awareness [1, 10], and the wide adoption of third
party applications on social sites (e.g. 3rd party Facebookapps) and internet browsers (e.g.
3rd party Chrome extensions), regular individuals have become themselves admins on their
own privacy polices. Managing access control policies is anessential task in the daily lives
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of individuals, who have to protect their private data (e.g., email address, location info,
birthday, etc.) and content (e.g., photos, videos, browserbookmarks, etc.), from unwanted
accesses by other online users and by third party applications. Security aware users will
manage their policies to the degree they can, that is, current p ivacy preserving mechanisms
do not provide users the capability to completely control their online privacy. For example,
at installation time, third party Facebook applications can request a set of permissions to
access a user’s Facebook profile data. At this point, users argiven two options: 1) Grant
the application all requested permissions, or 2) Opt-out ofinstalling the application (all-
or-nothing). It is clear that there is space to improve, and that security aware users should
be given fine-grained controls over their access control policies. In regards to security
unaware users, new tools should be introduced to guide and assist them in understanding
privacy issues and in making well-informed policy decision.
The challenges facing both administrators and individualsc ll for better privacy preserv-
ing mechanisms and better tools for managing access controlpolicies. Such tools should
provide the following:
• Simplified policy management: When access control policiesinvolve thousands of
attributes and rules, policy management tools need to simplify the way administrators
and users interact with a policy. This can be achieved by providing new presentation
layers that allow for easier interpretation of the policy, and the ability to focus on
relevant policy information without the need for a deep understanding of the policy
language. Simplifying policies, also allows administratos to easily and properly
analyze existing policies.
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• Assisted policy management: Assisting users and administrators in understanding
the consequences of their policy decisions is important, especially given the large
number of attributes and rules within policies, and the complex nature of existing
policy languages. Guiding users and administrators is achievable by utilizing exist-
ing decisions made by other potentially well-informed parties. That is, tools should
make use of existing knowledge in providing guidance to those making new policy
decisions. Guiding users could also be achieved by providing simplified descriptions
of the various access permissions.
• Fine-grained policy controls: We believe, that users should be able to control their
privacy policies to the extent they wish. That is, controlling individual privacy at-
tributes should be possible without the need to limit the options to “grant all ac-
cesses” or “nothing”. To achieve this, new tools are required which extend upon
current authorization flows.
• Policy Optimization: Policies with large numbers of rules,can easily introduce per-
formance bottlenecks, especially when faced with a huge number of policy evalu-
ation requests. Configuring such large policies for optimalperformance outcomes,
requires knowledge of all policy rules, and the ability to understand the outcome of
each possible configuration. There is a need for tools that can ake on this task, and
provide for configurations that lead to ideal performance.
XACML Policies: Many web services have adopted XACML (eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language) as the standard for specifying their access ontrol policies. XACML
policies can introduce performance bottlenecks when a large number of policy rules are
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involved. In our investigation, we found that existing XACML policy evaluation engines,
such as Sun’s Policy Decision Point Engine (PDP) [64], suffer from such performance
bottlenecks. For a 100,000 random policy evaluation requests, we found that a policy with
4000 rules, requires Sun’s PDP up to 1,152,460ms to evaluate. Even smaller policies, for
example of 75 rules, took up to 32,223 ms to evaluate. Such evaluation times are not
sufficient for running web services under high request loads. The bottleneck in existing
engines results from the sequential nature of evaluating policy rules. We believe that with
the proper policy structure optimization, i.e. the structure of its rules, we can achieve
improved performance outcomes.
Third Party Application Authorization: In our research we mainly focus on two types of
third party applications: 1) Social networking applications, and 2) Internet browser exten-
sions. Third party social networking applications run on social sites such as Facebook and
Twitter, and are widely adopted by users who wish to add new services on top of a site’s
core services. To do so, applications need to be authorized by users for a set of requested
accesses/permissions. For example, an application can request permission to access a user’s
birthday information on Facebook.
Third party browser extensions are also widely adopted and enrich the user browsing
experience. Extensions also request permissions that allow for performing privileged tasks
such as accessing a user’s browsing history, or executing custom scripts within certain
webpages visited.
The primary disadvantage of existing authorization mechanisms, is the lack of fine-
grained controls, that is, users have to authorize all requested accesses, or choose not to
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install an application in the first place. Authorizing thirdparty applications can be prob-
lematic, if they are malicious, and seek to use a user’s private d ta inappropriately. For
this reason, it is important that existing authorization methods be extended to provide fine-
grained controls. We investigated third party applications Facebook, and found that,
among popularly requested accesses, individuals - when given the choice - will, in the
majority of cases, deny the request.
SELinux Policies: The U.S. National Security Agency, introduced Security Enhanced
Linux (SELinux) for the purpose of incorporating a system-wide Mandatory Access Con-
trol (MAC) architecture into the Linux operating system. SELinux provides fine-grained
access control through its policy language, but in exchange, the language is very complex,
leading to complex policies that are hard to interpret and difficult to manage. SELinux
policies are mainly based ontypes, which represent labels on processes and files. That is,
policy rules are written in regards to these types. SELinux also comes with a set of de-
fault policies that potentially satisfy the needs of most Linux systems. When investigating
SELinux’s default policies, we found that thetargeteddefault policy contains over 1,780
types, and over 1,500,000 rules. Anotherstrict version of the default policy, contained over
2,300 types and 1,700,000 rules. With such a large number of types and rules, it’s clear
why many administrators face difficulties in managing SELinux policies [70, 44, 34].
1.1 Research Problem
The difficulty in managing access control policies can be dueto a number of factors:
• Complex Policy Language: Policy managers, whether normal individuals or admin-
istrators, are not well versed in existing complex policy languages. Because of this,
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it is difficult to easily interpret policies which in many cases can lead to policy mis-
configurations.
• Complex Policy Structure: Access control policies can involve large numbers of
attributes and rules which lead to difficulties in understanding the relations among
policy attributes and rules. This also leads to difficultiesin optimizing policies for
optimal performance.
• Limited Policy Management Tools: The lack of proper policy management tools,
that are able to guide users and administrators in making better policy decisions.
This becomes essential when decisions need to be made on new policy attributes
and rules, that is, introducing unknown elements into an existing policy. Such new
elements, can compromise the overall security of a system.
In the light of the existing challenges facing both administrators and individuals, we
investigate a number of clustering and recommendation based techniques for managing
access control policies. Clustering access control policies ould potentially optimize its
structure, leading to better performance outcomes. It can also simplify the policy presen-
tation, hence resulting in a policy that is easier to interprt and understand. On the other
hand, recommendation-based techniques could help in guiding users and administrators in
making well-informed policy decisions. These techniques can be based on the collective
collaboration of a community, and on existing knowledge rega ding a policy.
We define our research problem as follows:
Problem Statement:The average administrator and individual face many challenges when
managing their access control policies. These challenges can lead to policy misconfigura-
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tions, performance bottlenecks, and ill-informed policy decisions.
In this research proposal, we plan on overcoming existing challenges in access control
policy management. Our hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis Statement:Applying effective clustering and recommendation techniques onto
access control policies will allow for a simpler and more effective policy management pro-
cess that also guides users and administrators when making important policy decisions.
1.2 Overview of proposed solution
Managing access control policies is a complex and challenging process, which requires
executing a number of various tasks. We focus on three primary tasks:
Assisted Policy 
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Visualization-based 
Analysis Tools
Operating  Systems
Web Services
Social Network Profiles
Usage Data
ToolBox
Internet Browsers
A
c
c
e
s
s
 C
o
n
tr
o
l 
P
o
li
c
ie
s
Figure 1: Assisted Policy Management Model
1. Policy Configuration: Configuring an access control policy involves making a set of
decisions on what accesses should be allowed or denied. These decisions are what
define the policy, hence defining the overall security of the system under this policy.
If ill-informed decisions are made, they can easily compromise the security of a sys-
tem. Ill-informed decisions can be a result of: 1) complex policies that involve large
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numbers of rules and relations that are difficult to interpret, 2) The lack of a deep un-
derstanding of the policy language, and the understanding of possible consequences
related to certain policy decisions. 3) The lack of fine-grained controls on the policy
decisions that need to be made.
2. Policy Optimization: Optimizing access control policies s an essential task that can
involve: 1) Removing out-dated policy components, 2) Prioritizing policy compo-
nents according to demand, and 3) Assessing a policy’s overall structure, and finding
optimal structures, that lead to enhanced access control request evaluations. By per-
forming these optimization tasks, the storage footprint decreases, and performance
bottlenecks can be avoided. Such tasks become very difficultwhen dealing with
large policies, or policies that need to rapidly adapt to different scenarios and envi-
ronments.
3. Policy Analysis: Analyzing access control policies is a fundamental task, and is a
basis for the previous two tasks mentioned above. That is, toproperly configure and
optimize a policy, proper analyses need to take place. By analyzi g a policy, admin-
istrators are able to discover: potential misconfigurations, redundant policy rules,
out-dated components, and more. They are also able to get a deper understanding
of existing relations within a policy, and how various policy components are able to
interact with each other. With large policies, the analysisprocess gets tricky, due to
the vast number of relations, and the difficulty in presenting large amounts of analysis
data in an easily and interpretable fashion.
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In the light of these challenging tasks, and the fact that more usable and suitable tools are
needed to accommodate the needs of average administrators and individuals, we propose
a set of assisted policy management tools (see Figure 1), based on recommendation and
clustering techniques.
1.2.1 Recommendation-Based Policy Management Tools
The premise of these tools is to guide administrators and users in making better policy
decisions. Guidance is provided in the form of recommendations on new policy decisions.
Recommendations represent quantified indications of how comm n, or how risky, certain
decisions are. Recommendations are based on data collectedfrom various sources, such as
the collaborative decisions of communities, application behavior, existing stable policies,
and the nature of incoming access control policy requests. Ba ed on provided recommenda-
tions, administrators and users can make more well-informed decisions when configuring
their policies.
The proposed tools are also able to optimize policies by generati g recommendation val-
ues that are the basis of ranking/prioritizing policy components according to their demand.
That is, components that are most frequently used within a cert in range of time, get prior-
ity over components less used. Components with higher priority are given more importance
when evaluating incoming requests, which potentially removes performance bottlenecks.
Another advantage of recommendation-based tools is the ability to provide recommenda-
tions on a fine-grained level. Our proposed tools provide thenecessary fine-grained policy
controls, accompanied with fine-grained recommendations.
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1.2.2 Clustering-Based Policy Management Tools
Clustering-based tools analyze the properties of existingpolicy components. From these
properties, they are able to identify groups/clusters of tightly related components. Identified
clusters can then be used to: 1) provide abstractions on the components of a particular clus-
ter, that is, focus on what a cluster represents rather than wt each single component does.
2) optimize a policy’s structure based on its identified clusters, which potentially results
in improved policy evaluation times, by redirecting incoming requests to their appropriate
clusters, rather than the whole policy.
Our proposed clustering-based tools also provide effectivpolicy analysis capabilities.
This is achieved by utilizing identified clusters to discover n w relations among policy
components, and to visualize the results of policy analyses. Vi ualization occurs at the
cluster level, which dramatically reduces the complexity of analysis results.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:Chapter 2 discusses some of
the preliminaries regarding our research. Chapter 3 proposes an adaptive and clustering-
based approach for evaluating XACML policies, and discusses th experimental results
done. In Chapter 4 we propose a recommendation-based open authorization framework
that provides user with recommendations on permissions requested by third party social
networking applications. It also discusses our fine-grained control mechanism. Chapter 5
proposes a framework that provides fine-grained controls onthird party browser extension
permissions, in addition to increased user privacy awareness. The results of a user study
on the effectiveness of the framework are also discussed. Chapter 6 proposes a visualized-
based approach for analyzing SELinux policies, and discusses a risk-based model for newly
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added policy rules. Finally, in Chapter 7 we conclude the dissertation and discuss potential
future paths for extending upon this research.
CHAPTER 2: PRELIMINARIES
2.1 XACML Policies and Access Requests
In this section we provide the logic formalism adopted to denot XACML policies and
access requests. XACML policies are composed of five basic components, namely,Policy-
Set, Policy, Target, Rule, andPolicy and Rule Combining algorithmfor conflict resolution.
The root of the XACML policy is the PolicySet element, which is defined as follows:
Definition 1. PolicySet is a tuplePS = (id, t, P, PC), where:id is the PolicySet id,t
is the PolicySet Target element, and takes values from the se{Applicable, NotApplicable,
Indeterminate}, P = {p1, . . . , pn} is the set of policies, andPC is the policy combining
algorithm.
A Policyelement is a set of rules and conditions that control access to pro ected resources
which we refer to as objects. A policy contains atarget, a set ofrules, and arule combining
algorithm.
Definition 2. A policy is a tupleP = (id, t, R,RC), where:id is the policy id,t is the
policy target element, and takes values from the set{Applicable, NotApplicable, Indeter-
minate}, R = {r1, . . . , rn} is the set of rules, andRC is the rule combining algorithm.
The Target elementt specifies a set of predicates on the request attributes, which must
be met in a PolicySet, Policy or Rule to apply to a given request. The attributes in the target
element are categorized intoSubject, ResourceandAction. The attribute values in a request
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are compared with those included in the Target, if all the attribu es match then the Target’s
PolicySet, Policy or Rule is said to be Applicable. If the requ st and the Target attributes do
not match then the request is NotApplicable, and if the evaluation results in an error then
the request is said to be Indeterminate. If a request satisfies the target of a policy, then the
request is further checked against the rule set of the policy; otherwise, the policy is skipped
without further examining its rules. The Target predicatescan be quite complex, and can be
constructed using functions and attributes. The rule combining algorithmRC respectively
allows one to specify the approach to compute the decision result of a policy when the
policy contains rules evaluating to conflicting effects. The policy combining algorithmPC
follows the same logic but at the PolicySet level.
A Ruleidentifies a complete and atomic authorization constraint that can exist in isola-
tion with respect to the policy in which it has been created. We define rules as follows.
Definition 3. A Rule is a tupler = (id, t, e, c), where: id is the rule id,t is the rule
target element, and takes values from the set{Applicable, NotApplicable, Indeterminate},
e is the rule effect, where ∈ {Permit,Deny}, andc is a boolean condition against the
request attributes.
The rule target element is similar to the policy target instead it indicates the requests
applicable to the rule. The conditionc is a boolean function with respect to the request at-
tributes. The rule’s effecte, which can be Permit or Deny, is returned if the rule’s condition
c evaluates to true. The rule evaluation can also be Indeterminate in case of an error, or
NotApplicable if the rule’s target doesn’t apply to the requst’s attributes. Access requests
are typically matched against a policy set. A policy set is the root of an XACML policy, it
holds policy elements and, possibly, other policy sets. We denote access requests accord-
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<PolicySet PolicySetId="PSID"
PolicyCombiningAlgId="permit-overrides">
<Target/>
<Policy PolicyId="PID"
RuleCombiningAlgId="permit-overrides">
<Target/>
<Rule RuleId="RID1" Effect="Deny">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<Subject>Bob</Subject>
<Subject>John</Subject>
</Subjects>
<Resources>
<Resource>file2</Resource>
</Resources>
<Actions>
<Action>
<ActionMatch MatchId="string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="string">
read
</AttributeValue>
<ActionAttributeDesignator
AttributeId ="AID1" DataType ="string"/>
</ActionMatch>
</Action>
</Actions>
</Target>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId="RID2" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<Subject>Bob</Subject>
</Subjects>
<Resources>
<Resource>file1</Resource>
</Resources>
<Actions>
<Action>
<ActionMatch MatchId="string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="string">
read
</AttributeValue>
<ActionAttributeDesignator
AttributeId ="AID2" DataType ="string"/>
</ActionMatch>
</Action>
</Actions>
</Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>
</PolicySet>
Figure 2: XACML Policy Set example
ing to the following notation. LetS, O, A andX denote all subjects, objects, actions and
context variables in an access control system respectively.
Definition 4. (Access Request) An access requestq i the tuple(s, o, a, x), wheres ∈ S
is the subject making the request,o ∈ O is the requested object,a ∈ A is the requested
action on objecto, andx ∈ X are the context attributes.
Let us consider the PolicySet listed in Figure 2 which contains one policy with 2 rules.
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The first rule specifies that “Both Bob and John are denied readaccess to file2” where
each “Bob” and “John” is aSubject, “denied” is the ruleEffect, “read” is theAction, and
“file2” is the Object or Resource, whereas the second rule says “Bob has permission to
read file1”, “Bob” being theSubject, “has permission” theEffect, “read” theAction, and
“file1” the Object. Either rule could be accompanied with context parameters (Environment
Attributes) as part of a rule’s condition such as time, system variables, history, or location.
A target is a condition on subjects ∈ S, objecto ∈ O and the actiona ∈ A. If the
request satisfies the target conditions of a rule (policy) then we say that the rule (policy) is
applicableto the request, otherwise it isnot applicable. That is, if Bob makes a request to
read file1, his request would be applicable to the second rulewhich would return a Permit.
2.2 Third Party Application Authorization and APIs
Most of the major online platforms such as Facebook, Google,and Twitter, provide an
open API which allows third party applications to directly interact with their platform. APIs
provide a mechanism to read, write, or modify user information on these platforms through
other third party applications on behalf of users themselves. An API comes with a set of
methods, each representing a certain user interaction executed through a third party appli-
cation. For example, the FriendCameo [18] Facebook application is able to post content
(e.g. messages, photos) to a user’s Facebook feed/wall using Facebook’s/profile id/feed
API method, whereprofile id is the targeted Facebook user ID. It is important to note that
third party applications can potentially execute any API call on behalf of a user, relying
on the type and scope of permissions granted to these apps. Inthe previous example, the
FriendCameo application could only perform the/profile id/feedAPI call, given the user
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has granted it the “publishstream” permission. The full set of permissions available to
third party apps are defined by the online platforms, and it isup to third party applications
to request the proper subset of permissions required. We believe users should have the final
decision on whether to grant requested permissions or not.
2.2.1 OAuth Standard
With an increasing trend towards offering online services that provide third party ap-
plications the ability to interact through open APIs and access user resources, OAuth was
introduced as a secure and efficient mechanism for authorizing third party applications
[52]. Traditional authentication models such as the client-server model require third party
applications to authenticate with online services using the resource owner’s private creden-
tials, typically a username and password. This requires users to present their credentials
to third party applications, hence granting them broad access to all their online resources
with no restrictions. A user may revoke access from a third paty application by changing
her credentials, but doing so subsequently revokes access from all third party applications
that continue to use her previous credentials. These issuesare amplified given the high
number of third party applications that potentially get access to a user’s online resources.
OAuth uses a mechanism where the roles of third party applications and resource owners
are separated. It does not require users to share their private credentials with third party
applications, instead it issues a new set of credentials foreach application. These new set
of credentials are per application, and reflect a unique set of permissions to a user’s online
resources. In OAuth, these new credentials are representedvia anAccess Token. An Access
Token is a string which denotes a certain scope of permissiongranted to an application,
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it also denotes other attributes such as the duration the Accss Token is considered valid.
We are mainly interested in the scope attribute within an Access Token. Access Tokens are
issued by an authorization server after the approval of the resource owner. In this research
we extend upon this authorization stage of the OAuth 2.0 protocol.
When a third party application needs to access a user’s protected resources, it presents its
Access Token to the service provider hosting the resource (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) which
in turn verifies the requested access against the scope of permissions denoted by the Token.
For example, Alice (resource owner) on Facebook (service provider and resource server)
can grant the FriendCameo application (client) access to her email address on her Face-
book profile without ever sharing her username & password with FriendCameo. Instead,
she authenticates the FriendCameo application with Facebook (authorization server) which
in turn provides FriendCameo with a proper Access Token thatdenotes permission to ac-
cess Alice’s email address.
OAuth provides multiple authorization flows depending on the client (third party applica-
tion) type (e.g. web server, native applications). We focuson theAuthorization Codeflow
shown in figure 3 and detailed in the OAuth 2.0 specification [52]. The authorization code
flow is used by third party applications that are able to interact with a user’s web browser,
and are able to receive incoming requests via redirection. The authorization flow process
consists of three parties: 1)End-user (resource owner) at browser, 2)Client (third party ap-
plication), and 3)Authorization server (e.g. Facebook). Our main focus is on steps “(A)”
and “(B)” within the authorization code flow [52]. Step “(A)”is where third party applica-
tions initiate the flow by redirecting a user’s browser to theauthorization server and pass
along the requested scope of permissions. In step “(B)”, theauthorization server authenti-
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cates the end-user, and establishes her decision on whetherto grant or deny the third party
application’s access request.
End-User 
at 
Browser 
Web 
Client 
Authorization 
Server 
(A) (C) 
(A) Client Identifier & 
 Redirect URI 
(B) User authenticates 
(C) Authorization Code 
(D) Client Credentials, 
Authorization Code,  
& Redirect URI 
 
(E) Access Token 
(w/ Optional Refresh Token) 
  
Figure 3: Authorization Code OAuth Flow
2.2.2 OAuth and User Privacy
One of the main reasons behind OAuth was to increase user privacy by separating the
role of users from that of third party applications. OAuth uses the concept of Access To-
kens, where a token denotes a set of credentials granted to third party applications by the
resource owners [52]. This avoids the need for users to sharet eir private credentials such
as their username & password. It also allows users to revoke access to a specific third party
application by revoking its Access Token.
OAuth 2.0 allows third party applications to request a set ofpermissions via thescope
attribute, and for users to grant/deny such requests. If a user grants a third party applica-
tion’s request, then an Access Token (denoting thescope) is issued for that application,
hence granting it the scope of permissions requested. Thescope attribute represents the
set of permissions requested by third party applications, ad is our main focus in this work.
In the authorization code OAuth flow seen in figure 3, thescope parameter is part of
the request URI that is generated by third party applications (Step “(A)” in figure 3). The
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scope is a list of space-delimited strings, each string mapped to acertain permission
or access level. For example, the FriendCameo application requests permission to post
to a user’s Facebook feed/wall, to log in to Facebook chat, toaccess her email address,
and to check her friend’s online/offline presence. FriendCameo requests these permis-
sions with ascope attribute value of “publish stream, xmpp login, email,
friends online presence”. The scope value becomes part of the OAuth request
URI sent to the authorization server (Facebook’s OAuth imple entation uses commas
rather than spaces to separate each requested permission).Step “(B)” of figure 3 is where
users grant/deny the requestedscope value.
2.3 Collaborative Filtering in Recommendation Systems
Recommendation systems are systems that try to assist usersin evaluating and making
decisions on items by providing them opinions and prediction values as a set of recommen-
dations [55]. These set of recommendations are usually based on other people’s opinions
and the potential relevance of items to a target user. The first recommender system Tapestry
[19], followed the approach of “Collaborative Filtering” in which users collaborate towards
filtering documents via their individual reactions after reading certain documents. Since
then, the “Collaborative Filtering” approach has been widely adopted and is accepted as a
highly successful technique in recommender systems [38, 45, 39, 63].
In a context of access control and user privacy, items in a coll b rative filtering model
can be mapped to individual privacy attributes or permissions. Users have to make deci-
sions on privacy attributes, i.e. grant them to third party applications or not. This is similar
to other recommendation systems in which users make decisions on items, e.g. to rent or
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not rent a certain movie. Users can benefit from recommendations on privacy attributes
which are based on the collaborative decisions of all users.Similarly, users benefit from
movie ratings in making their decision to rent a movie.
2.4 Third Party Browser Extensions
Third party browser extensions are widely used within majorbr wsers such as Firefox,
Chrome, and Safari [50, 66]. Users can enhance their browsing experience by adding
new functionalities or modifying the core browser functionalities. To provide extended
functionaly, extensions request a set of permissions whichave to be authorized by their
users. We focus on the permission model for Google Chrome extensions, where extensions
request permissions at install time but also have the ability to request optional permissions
after installation.
2.4.1 Chrome Extensions
Chrome extensions are built using a mix of required and optional components. Specif-
ically, a requiredmanifest.json, at least onehtml file (background.html or
popup.html), and other additional resources such as JavaScript files, images, and other
HTML files.
Manifest: Themanifest.json file is a required component for each extension, and
provides information on an extension’s properties, requested permissions, and other at-
tributes. In this paper, we focus on thep rmissions,plugins, andcontent scripts
properties within the manifest. These are properties related to the privacy of the user when
using third party extensions.
Background Page: An optional HTML page that many extensionsuse for managing
21
background activities. This is used by extensions that needto stay active at all times or be
able to perform continuous tasks. Our proposed framework targe s background pages when
adapting third party extensions to our model.
Content Scripts: These are scripts that run within the context of a webpage that exten-
sions want to interact with. That is, the content script can read and modify a webpage
and pass messages back to its parent extension. An example extension that uses content
scripts is the Google Dictionary extension which shows a popu with the description of
a selected word within a webpage. Extensions declare the hosts targeted by their content
scripts within themanifest.json. Note that extensions are also able to programmat-
ically inject custom scripts into webpages using thechrome.tabs.executeScript
API.
NPAPI Plugins: For purposes of supporting legacy code, Chrome allows for embedding
NPAPI plugins within newly developed extensions. NPAPI plugins allow for executing na-
tive code, i.e. calling native binary code from within an extension’s JavaScript. This gives
an extension user level access to the user’s machine. Such extensions, if compromised,
could highly risk the user’s privacy. iMacros [29] is a popular extension that uses NPAPI
plugins to store a user’s recorded macros on to the the file syst m.
2.5 SELinux Policies
SELinux policies are considered quite difficult to manage duto the granular level of
controls they provide [70, 44, 34]. Even though this is true,an SELinux policy at its core
is no different than other access control policies in which aset of rules are introduced to
enforce and achieve an overall security goal. A typical access control policy rule is built
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around asubjectwhich is granted certainactionson a certainobject. For example, John
(subject) is allowed to play (action) all mp3 files (object) on a system. The same model is
applied in SELinux policy rules but with more elaborate and fie-grained levels of control.
SELinux labels each resource, such as files and processes within an SELinux-enabled sys-
tem with asecurity context. A security context is a label that usually incorporates three
fields: 1) SELinux User, 2) Role, and 3) Type. Our focus is on the “Type”, which repre-
sents the core of access control rules that determine whatsubject-typeshave what accesses
on whichobject-types. Object-types are defined to group file objects, whereas subject-
types are defined for processes. Objects that fall under the sam object-type, are similar
in which subjects access them. Subjects or processes that are under the same subject-
type, are similar in which objects or files they access. An example of an object-type is the
user_home_t type, which is used to group files owned by a user and reside in his/her
home directory. Grouping here, is achieved by setting the typ within each file’s security
context touser_home_t. An example subject-type is thettpd_t type, which belongs
to the Apache HTTP server process.
We also focus on Access Vector (AV)allow rules within an SELinux policy. AVallow
rules are responsible for allowing accesses between types.A typical AV allow rule specifies
how a subject-type is allowed to interact with an object-type. The building blocks of any
AV allow rule are the following:
- Subject-type: The subject of the access control rule whichis granted certain accesses.
- Object-type: The object or resource to be accessible by thesubject of this rule.
- Object-class: Each object within SELinux falls under a certain class (object-class).
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Each object-class has a corresponding set of applicable actions (permissions). For
example,file anddir are object-classes that respectively correspond to files and di-
rectories within a system. Having object-classes allows for easier management of
permissions on objects. For example, are dpermission has a different interpretation
when applied to files vs. directories, hence having an associated permission set for
each object-class allows for easier interpretation of the int nded permission, i.e.read
on object-classfile is not the same asreadon object-classdir.
- Permissions: For each object-class there is an associatedset of permissions, i.e. a set
of actions that the subject can take on the object. For example, thefile class has the
permissionsread, write, create, renamean so forth.
Following is an example AV allow rule written in the SELinux AV rule syntax:
allow httpd_t httpd_log_files_t : file {read create}
this reads as: allow the subject-typehttpd_t to read and createfiles of object-type
httpd_log_files_t. Or in a more readable format this reads: Allow the Apache
HTTP process to read and create its log files.
2.5.1 Custom SELinux Policy Modules
Administrators (admins) are frequently required to write custom policy modules for new
services and applications that are installed onto a Linux system. Such modules contain a set
of new policy rules that are incorporated into the existing SELinux policy to allow the new
services to function properly. Given the nature of SELinux policies in respect to the large
number of types and rules they contain, admins rely on policytools [32, 27] for generating
new policy rules that can be used to adapt new services.
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audit2allow [32] and SEEdit’saudit2spdl[74] are two of the most common tools for
generating new policy rules based on audit logs. It is then thadmin’s responsibility to
either add these new rules to the existing policy directly, or tweak them before hand.
CHAPTER 3: ADAPTIVE REORDERING & CLUSTER-BASED FRAMEWORK FOR
EFFICIENT XACML POLICY EVALUATION
The adoption of XACML as the standard for specifying access control policies for var-
ious applications, especially web services is vastly increasing. This calls for high perfor-
mance XACML policy evaluation engines. A policy evaluatione gine can easily become
a bottleneck when enforcing XACML policies with a large number of rules. We propose
an adaptive approach for XACML policy optimization. We apply a clustering technique to
policy sets based on the K-means algorithm. In addition to clustering we find that, since
a policy set has a variable number of policies and a policy hasa variable number of rules,
their ordering is important for efficient execution. By clustering policy sets and reordering
policies and rules in a policy set and policies respectively, we formulated and solved the
optimal policy execution problem. The proposed clusteringtechnique categorizes policies
and rules within a policy set and policy respectively in respect to target subjects. When
a request is received, it is redirected to applicable policies and rules that correspond to its
subjects; hence, avoiding unnecessary evaluations from occurring. We also propose a us-
age based framework that computes access request statistics to dynamically optimize the
ordering access control to policies within a policy set and rules within a policy. Reordering
is applied to categorized policies and rules from our proposed clustering technique.
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3.1 Related Work
Much research has been done on optimizing XACML policy evaluation. In [40], Liu et
al. present one of the most interesting proposals on optimization of XACML policies so far.
Liu et al, focus on improving performance by numericalizingand normalizing XACML
Policies. The numericalization is used to convert the string policies into numbers as nu-
merical comparison is more efficient. Further, normalized policies are converted into a flat
policy structure. In doing this, the authors replace the different rule-combining algorithms
with only one, viz. First-Applicable. They then proceed to convert the numericalized,
normalized policies into tree data structures for efficientpolicy evaluation.
Miseldine [46] proposes to achieve policy optimization by mini izing the average cost
of finding a match at the rule level the target level and the policy level. The work assumes
no changes to the XACML specification, in that the Sun’s XACMLimplementation is
not altered. Miseldine approaches this problem by usingpolicy configurations. A policy
configuration is the relationship of policy and rule targetsto members of the set of rules
R, the set of subjects S and the set of actions A. Combinationsof sets are sought such that
policy targets are formed from S.R, R.A or S.A .
Kolovski [37] formalizes XACML policies using descriptionlogics (DL), and exploits
existing DL verifiers to conduct policy verification. Their policy verification framework
can detect redundant XACML rules. The idea of removing redundant policies is interesting
and may be useful to improve evaluation times. However, it isyet to be validated whether
the improvement will be worth the time needed to remove redundant policies, and how
significant the overall improvement would be.
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One related area where similar optimization techniques areoften explored is Firewall
Filtering [23, 22]. In this respect, our work on optimization f XACML policies shares
some similarities to the optimization of firewall filtering approaches. Firewall optimization
is different from that of XACML policy optimization in that amajor portion of the traf-
fic packets match a small subset of the firewall rules, and the same distribution of traffic
is maintained over a significant period of time. This skewness is not experienced in the
incoming requests for an XACML policy. Also note that firewall rules have an order of
precedence defined, while rules in an XACML policy do not. These two properties of fire-
wall rules allow the authors to prove in [23] and [22] that theoptimal firewall rule ordering
problem is NP-Complete. Despite these differences betweenfirewall filtering optimization
and optimization of XACML policies, we can still draw from the body of work on firewalls,
specifically from [23].
3.2 Policy and Rule Reordering Framework
When a web server needs to enforce an XACML policy with a largenumber of rules, its
XACML policy evaluation engine may easily become the performance bottleneck for the
server. To enable an XACML policy evaluation engine to process simultaneous requests
of large quantities in real time, especially in face of a burst volume of requests, an effi-
cient XACML policy evaluation engine is necessary. In such environments the requests’
distribution is dynamic in terms of volume, types and type ofrequesters. Motivated by
such observation, we develop an adaptive framework that dynamically determines the best
ordering according to the incoming requests and the recently received history of requests
and executions.
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3.2.1 Execution Vector and Policy Permutation
In what follows for the sake of presentation we focus on policy permutation where a
similar approach is adopted for PolicySet permutation. We define a policy permutation as
follows:
Definition 5. (Policy Permutation)Given a policyP with a rule setP.R = {r1, . . . , rn},
a policy permutationπ is a policyPπ generated by the following procedure:
(0) Pπ.R = {}, Pπ.id = P.id, Pπ.t = P.t, andPπ.RC = P.RC.
(1) P ′ is a copy of P.
(2) Select a random ruleri from P ′ and appendri to the end ofPπ.
(3) Repeat step2 until P ′ is empty.
Policy permutation may alter the correctness of a policy, and result in different evalua-
tions for a same set of requests. We are interested in policy permutations that do not alter
the policy evaluation results for any request.
Definition 6. (Safe Policy Permutation)A safe policy permutationπ of a policyP is safe
iff all requests permitted (denied) by the permuted policyPπ are also permitted (denied) by
P .
We assume all requests are well formed such that the policy evaluation returns PERMIT
or DENY by the PDP. Using such an assumption, we provide the below theorem:
Theorem 0.1. Safe Permit (Deny) Overrides Permutation. A policy P having a rule
combining algorithmP.RC set to Permit-Overrides or Deny-Overrides is safe with respect
to all possible policy permutations.
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Proof. The semantics of the permit overrides is that if any rule evaluates to permit then
the final authorization decision is permit. Assuming each rule eturns either permit or deny
then the policy evaluation of a policyP , with a permit overrides rule combing algorithm
is the disjunction of all the rule results represented by:E(P ) = E(r1) ∨ · · · ∨ E(rn).
The disjunction operator is commutative wherea ∨ b = b ∨ a, and associative where
(a ∨ b) ∨ c = a ∨ (b ∨ c), thus the evaluation of the policyP and any permutationPπ are
equalE(P ) = E(Pπ). The deny override follows similar semantics and follows a similar
proof.
Using Theorem 0.1, policies with permit override or deny overrid rule combining al-
gorithms can be permuted without affecting the policy semantics. This does not hold for
other rule combining algorithms such as First-Applicable.W focus our discussion on per-
mit and deny override combining algorithms for reordering optimization. As discussed in
the following sections, policy based categorization is independent of the rule combining
algorithm used.
Given a policy permutationπ and a given requestq, a subset of rules is of relevance. We
represent an ordering of such rules as theex cution vector.
Definition 7. (Execution vector)Γ = [r1, . . . , rn] is the execution vector representing
the set of applicable rules, where ruleri is executed before ruleri+1. π(i) refers to the
position for ruleri in execution vector.
According to Theorem 1, any policy execution vector for a policy P having permit over-
rides rule combining algorithm will evaluate to the same effect asP , the challenge is to
evaluate the execution vector that will provide the lowest latency. Hence, we need to define
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the rule weights in order to present our optimal rule ordering approach.
3.2.2 Computation of Rule Weights
Our approach relies on statistics and metrics collected as PDP receives requests. Statis-
tics are collected at two separate levels:policy andrule level. At the policy level, we are
interested in understanding how often a policy applies, andby which class of users. At
the rule level, it is important to identify the class of efficient execution vectors. In order to
collect meaningful metrics, we assign to each rule (policy)weights that reflect the domi-
nance of this rule in the requests. The weights are based on the PDP returned values, and
constructed based on the 1) frequency and the 2) complexity of the rule (policy).
During a given time interval the number of times a policyPi or a rulerj gets evaluated is
referred to as the hit frequency. We refer to the hit frequency by f and use the dot notation
to refer to policy(Pi.f) and rule(rj.f) hit frequency. Statistics with respect to the hit
frequency are accumulated as follows:
• Policy (Rule) Permit Ratio:Records the ratio between the number of times a policy
(rule) returns a permit with respect to the number of times a policy (rule) gets evalu-
ated, wherePi.p andrj.p represent the policy and rule permit ratios respectively.
• Policy (Rule) Deny Ratio:Records the ratio between the number of times a policy
(rule) returns a deny with respect to the number of times a policy (rule) gets evaluated.
WherePi.d andrj.d represent the policy and rule deny ratios respectively.
• Policy (Rule) Hit Ratio: Records the ratio between the number of times a policy
(rule) is applicable with respect to the number of times a policy (rule) gets evaluated.
WherePi.a andrj .a represent the policy and rule hit ratios respectively.
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Figure 4: Log Based XACML Policy Evaluation Framework
Note that all the above statistics are easily derived from the XACML execution log (see
Figure 4). In addition to the rule evaluation statistics we also consider the rule compu-
tational complexity. Rules vary from simple conditions to mre complicated statements
that require the parsing of an XML document or querying a database. The rule complexity
metric is related to the number of operations required to execute the rule, we compute it
as the number of boolean atomic conditions appearing in a rule, both at target and at the
condition element. Letn(t) denote the number of conditions in the Target element (de-
noted ast according to Def. 3), and letn(c) be the number of conditions in the Condition
elementc. XACML supports over 100 standard functions that could be used in the boolean
conditions, for example theBelong to. We assign a costmi to each standard function
stdi appearing in the rule.mi is computed by estimating the average execution time of the
function. The simple atomic boolean conditions are assigned a constant costk. For a rule
rj the complexity metric is given by:
Ej = k ∗ (n(rj.t) + n(rj.c)) +
∑
stdi∈rj
mi
wherestdi represents a uniquely identified standard function appearing in rj . Using both
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the accumulated rule statistics and the complexity metric for a rulerj we compute the rule
cost as follows:
cj = β ∗ Ej + α ∗ Fj
Here,β andα are weights that allow system administrators to tune the computation cost,
based on the local constraints, such as the available processing power and network band-
width.
The rule cost is designed to represent the cost of computing arule, the complexity metric
Ej easily represents the rule cost, however the other component is based on the rule’s
accumulated statisticsFj. The value ofFj is based on the rule combining algorithm, for
example if a rule combining algorithm is Permit-Overrides then the metricFj is based on
the decreasing function with respect to the rule permit ratio (rj .p) or an increasing function
with respect to the rule deny ratio (rj .d). Intuitively, this implies that the rules need to be
reordered such that for a policy with the permit overrides rule combining algorithm, the
rule rj with the lowestcj is to be evaluated first.
3.2.3 Optimal Rule Reordering
Using the rule cost metrics we present our optimal rule reordring problem. Given a
policy (Pi), the optimal request execution problem (REP) is to find an execution sequence
that requires the minimum number of rule evaluations. We assume that rules within policies
are evaluated sequentially. The policyPi, composed ofn rules{r1, . . . , rn}, whereπ(j)
refers to the position (depth) for rulerj in the policy execution vector. The cost associated
with rule rj as computed in Section 3.2.2 is referred to ascj. The expected cost (i.e.,
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average search length) for a given permutationπ is given by:
Φi =
n
∑
j=1
cjπ(j)
The main challenge is to compute the optimal policy permutation π that will generate the
minimum expected policy execution cost. Additionally, among the possibly optimalπ, we
need to ensure the policy permutation to be safe, as defined inDefi ition 6. By computing
Φi we are able to generate a cost metric for each policyPi.
A policy setPS is composed of a set of policies{P1, . . . , Pm}. We assume the policies
are executed sequentially. Using the minimum policy expected ostΦi, and the collected
policy evaluation statistics, we compute the policy set execution sequence. The position
of policy Pi in the policy set execution sequence is referred to byξ(i). The expected cost
(average search length) for a given policy set(PSk) permutationξ is given by:
Ψk =
m
∑
i=1
Φiξ(i)
The costsΦi andΨk are minimized when policies and rules are ordered in ascending order
with respect to their costs [57]. Figure 5, shows the algorithm used at both the policyset
and policy levels.
For example, consider a school database. During certain time periods, the access re-
quests would be more uniform and from the same class of users (e.g. at the beginning of a
semester most requests would be from students needing to register for courses, whereas fac-
ulty requests will be much less), while during other time periods, more heterogeneous set
of requests may be submitted. In section 3.4 of this proposal, we show how our framework
adapts to the different types of requests received and how wecan benefit from policy/rule
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Algorithm: optimize policyset
Input: Policy Set PS = {P1, . . . , Pm},
Output: Optimal Policy Set Permutation PS∗
1: if PS.PC = Permit-Overrides or Deny-Overrides
2: PS∗ ← {}
3: for each Pi ∈ PS
4: P ∗i ← optimize policy(Pi)
5: if PS.alg = Permit-Overrides
6: P ∗i .c = α ∗ P
∗
i .Φ+ β ∗ Pi.p
−1
7: elseif PS.alg = Deny-Overrides
8: P ∗i .c = α ∗ P
∗
i .Φ+ β ∗ Pi.d
−1
9: PS∗.insert(P ∗i ) //Priority Queue on P
∗
i .c
10: return PS∗
11: return PS
Algorithm: optimize policy
Input: Policy P = {r1, . . . , rn},
Output: Optimal Policy Permutation P ∗
1: if P.RC = Permit-Overrides or Deny-Overrides
2: P ∗ ← {}
3: for each rj ∈ P
4: Ej = k ∗ (n(rj .t+ rj .c)) +
∑
stdi∈rj
mi
5: if P.RC = Permit-Overrides
6: Fj = rj .p−1
7: elseif P.RC = Deny-Overrides
8: Fj = rj .d−1
9: cj = β ∗ Ej + α ∗ Fj
10: P ∗.insert(rj) //Priority Queue on cj
11: P ∗.Φ =
∑n
j=1 cjπ(j)
12: return P ∗
13: return P
Figure 5: Optimal PolicySet and Policy Reordering
reordering.
Weights can be updated according to two different strategies: 1) periodically, 2) based
on the lastρ received requests. In the first case, we update the weight values using the
latest statistics. New execution vectors are constructed using fresh rule weights in order
to boost up the hit performance close to its optimum level. The update period should be
based on the predictable incoming request (e.g., certain months of the year) flow changes.
In the latter case, the optimal execution vectors are constructed based on the computed
rule weights. The incoming access requests are then processed according to the ordering
determined. Intuitively, the maximal reduction is obtained when the incoming requests
perfectly match the requests’ distribution. Notice that more than one execution vector
could be optimal and safe. However, since not all rules have the same complexity, different
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execution vectors may sensibly influence the overall evaluation time, even if a safe and
efficient policy permutation is found.
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Figure 6: Policy Set and Views
3.3 Categorization Based Optimization
The optimization problem minimizes the average request evaluation time. This approach
is ideal if the policy requests follow a uniform statistic. However, this approach is unlikely
to be satisfactory in scenarios where the requests’ distribution is dynamic in terms of vol-
ume and type of requesters. If we solely rely on reordering, assuming a role based access
control (RBAC) system of two roles, saystudentandfaculty, where there are on average
100 student requests for every faculty request, the computed statistics will be guided by the
student requests. As such, the optimization problem present d above will favor the student
role. Reordering rules and policies in these circumstancesis not sufficient, as the computa-
tional cost will not be given by the evaluation of the rules themselves, rather it will heavily
depend on the time spent on finding the applicable policies tothe given request.
Hence, in order to further improve the efficiency of the rule reordering, we resort to clus-
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tering the policies. Building on execution vectors, an intuitive mechanism is to categorize
the policies based on the subjects. Starting from a set ofL[S] clusters, whereL[S] is the
number of subjects inS, the goal is first to reduce the number of categories in order to
allow the reordering to have a considerable effect on the execution time. Second, to reduce
the memory footprint needed for caching the categories. When t categorization is done
on a per-subject basis, to record an improvement in the execution time the policies must be
adequately large. This happens because, when there is a category for each subject, there is
essentially a unique execution vector for that subject. When large policies are evaluated,
the categorization helps provide a good match for the execution vector and hence fewer
rules are evaluated, thereby improving the evaluation time. In case of small policies, to
make categorization effective, we need to decrease the number of categories to be searched
in order to find the execution vector. In order to resolve thisissue, we resort to further clus-
tering the requests. Figure 6, shows a PolicySet and the diffrent applicable views based
on the involved subject, where each view could serve as a subject ased category.
To achieve these results, we propose adopting an algorithm based on theK-Means clus-
tering method [71]. Generally speaking, theK-Means algorithm is used to clusterm ob-
jects based on attributes intok partitions,k < m. Each cluster consists of a “center” around
which individual elements of the data set being clustered argrouped together. This group-
ing is done based on some measure of similarity to the other elements in that cluster. In
our domain, the number of clustersNc and the centers of these clusters, i.e.Nc subjects are
chosen at random from the set of subjectsS. The set of centers (or clusters) is referred to
asCs. Each subjectSi ∈ S is considered, and its similarityDi,k is calculated with respect
to each subjectSk ∈ Cs in the different clusters.Si will be added to that cluster where the
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similarityDi,k is maximum. The strength of this simple algorithm lies in theway the sim-
ilarity metricDi,k is calculated. The similarity metric aims to cluster together the subjects
that share a large number of policies which are applicable toall of them. LetPi represents
the set of policies applicable to a given subjectSi and letL[Pi] be the number of policies
applicable to that subject. The number of policies shared between two subjects,Si andSk
is given byL[Pi ∩ Pk]. The fraction of the number of policies shared between the two
subjects that are a part ofL[Pi] is given byΘi,k, where:
Θi,k =
L[Pi ∩ Pk]
L[Pi]
The similarity metricDi,k between subjectSi andSk is calculated as followsDi,k = Θi,k+
Θk,i. The subjectSi is grouped with the cluster centering onSk whereDi,k is maximum.
This ensures that only those subjects which have a large number of policies in common are
grouped together. In general, the clustering is more effectiv when the number of shared
policies is large, i.e. whenL[Pi ∩ Pk] is large. The number of clustersNc should be
chosen carefully. The larger the valueNc, the lesser visible will the effect of reordering be.
This is more evident when we consider the fact that asNc approachesL[S], we essentially
experience the initial effect of havingL[S] unique categories for each of the subjects. On
the other hand, shouldNc be too small, the improvement obtained by categorization is
completely lost, because asNc approaches ’1’, all the subjects belong to the same cluster.
In other words, there are no clusters at all.
This algorithm allows us to tune our optimization approach such that we can either max-
imize the improvement due to clustering or due to reordering, or both, based on the specific
context.
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3.4 Experimental Results
Our experiments were conducted on both synthetic policies and real world-based poli-
cies. The synthetic polices were divided into two sets of test suites. The first test suite
deals with XACML policy sets where subjects have a small number of applicable rules.
The second suite investigates policy sets where subjects have a l rge number of applicable
rules, and will show the significant effect of applying our reordering technique to large
policy sets. The real world-based policy sets are policies built using existing data sets, and
properly modified to fit our framework without changing the semantics -or the structure- of
the policies. Precisely, we tested the policies by Fisler etal. [17], which they used for their
Margrave tool. Our experiments ensure that all policies areloaded into memory before ex-
ecuting any request evaluations. This ensures that evaluation times are not skewed by any
policy loading time. All tests were conducted using 100,000randomly generated XACML
requests. All requests have a single value for the subject, rsource, and action.
Our experimental process includes two main stages; First, the setup stage and, Second,
the request evaluations. The setup stage includes three sub-stages:
S1. Categorization of the experimental policy sets. Categorization is performed as ex-
plained in Section 3.3. The number of categories used for each policy set ranges
fromN toN/10, whereN is the number of unique subjects within a policy set,
S2. Training stage that collects the results of request evaluations (permit, deny, not-
applicable, indeterminate) subsequently used for the reordering stage,
S3. Reordering policies within the policy set and all rules within each policy according
to the statistics we gathered during the training stage.
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The setup stage needs to be executed only once, however the sub-stages (S2) and (S3)
could be executed repeatedly to retrain and reorder the policies and rules to achieve better
performance. For our tests, we chose not to repeat the sub-stages, and thus measure the
performance in the worst case scenario. The results of categorization and reordering are
cached in memory. During the second stage the access requests ar actually evaluated,
using the ordering and categories set up in the previous stage. The processing time is the
time needed to evaluate a request against a policy subjectedto our setup stage plus the time
to make a decision on that request. The preprocessing time isth time needed to complete
the setup stage.
3.4.1 Real World-Based policies
The experiments on real world-based policies used the policy sets by Fisler et al. [17],
specifically CodeA, CodeB, CodeC, & CodeD. We also added another policy that we call
CodeDMod, which is an enlarged version of the policy CodeD. This policy set contains 11
policies and 75 rules in total. We include this policy in order to evaluate the performance
of our framework with larger real world policies. As highlighted by [36], it is difficult to
access large real world policies that are publicly available, due to the confidential informa-
tion these policies typically carry. Another issue highligted by other authors [28] is the
fact that XACML policies tend to get larger and more complicated with time, hence we
introduced CodeDMod to represent such a large policy.
The results of the experiments done on the real world-based policies are summarized as
follows: In all cases we obtain at least a 78% performance improvement over Sun’s PDP.
Despite the nature of our framework which best suits large policies, our optimization engine
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still provides a significant performance boost in the case ofsmaller policies, e.g. CodeA is
a policy set with only 2 rules. The policy CodeDMod which is a much larger policy, shows
a performance boost of over 91% over Sun’s PDP. We also noticethe difference between
using categorization only and the effect of adding reordering to the framework. Reordering
boosts the evaluation performance up to 22% over using categorization only. This is no-
ticeable in the case of CodeDMod where reordering has an effect on its 11 policies’ and 75
rules’ order. In the smaller policy sets CodeA, CodeB, CodeC, & odeD, reordering does
not provide a big performance boost over categorization only, but still gives up to 8.5%
better performance in the case of CodeA.
3.4.2 Synthetic Policies
We test our framework against large synthetic policies to shw the scalability of the
framework and the high performance that it provides in the case of very large policies.
We divide the synthetic policies into two test suites, each of which has policy sets of sizes
ranging from 400 to 4000 rules. The following sections explain the test suites’ results in
detail.
Test Suite I Results: This test suite deals with policy sets where, each subject has a few
number of applicable rules. This test case is used to emphasize the effect of our catego-
rization technique, whereas our reordering technique may have a minor effect. This test
suite uses policy sets of 4000, 2000, 1000, and 400 rules. Foreach policy set, rules are
divided evenly among 100 policies. For the sake of testing thePermit Overridescombining
algorithm is used for all the test policy sets and policies. Uing this test suite our approach
is 1638 times faster than the Sun PDP.
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Figure 7: Experimental Results for Test Suite 1.
Results with Categorization Only: We carried out a first set of tests only applying the
categorization technique with no reordering. The number ofcategories used for each policy
set was varied fromN to N/10, whereN is the number of unique subjects within a policy
set. The preprocessing time for this approach is the time needed for categorizing a policy
set (sub-stage S1.). When usingN categories, results show that preprocessing a policy set
of 100 policies and 4000 rules takes about 25138 ms and a policy set of 100 policies and
400 rules takes about 913 ms. WhenN/10 categories are used, preprocessing times are
23464 ms and 487 ms for the 4000-rule and 400-rule policy setsrespectively.
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The experimental results demonstrate that the total processing times for our approach
is at least 172 times faster than Sun’s PDP. For a policy set of100 policies and 4000
rules while usingN/10 categories, it takes 973.1 ms to evaluate 100,000 random requests,
whereas Sun’s PDP takes about 1152460 ms. A policy set with 400 rules takes 760.2 ms
and Sun’s PDP takes about 130421.3 ms. WhenN categories are used, total processing
times are 714.6 ms and 624.6 ms for the 4000-rule and 400-rulepolicy sets respectively.
Figure 7(a) shows the complete results when using categorization alone with respect to the
number of categories used, which range from 0 to 3000.
Results with Categorization plus Reordering: For this set of tests, we applied the catego-
rization technique, followed by our reordering technique.The number of categories used
also range fromN toN/10. We make use of all sub-stages within the setup stage. Prepro-
cessing time in this case is the time for both categorizationand reordering of rules. The
results for this set of tests are reported in Figure 7(b). Theexperimental results shows that
the total processing times for our approach is at least 171 times faster than Sun’s PDP. For
a policy set of 100 policies and 4000 rules while usingN/10 categories, it takes 967.5
ms to evaluate 100,000 random requests, whereas Sun’s PDP takes about 1152460 ms. A
policy set with 400 rules takes 763 ms and Sun’s PDP takes about 130421.3 ms. When
N categories are used, total processing times are 703.7 ms and616.2 ms for the 4000-rule
and 400-rule policy sets respectively. Figure 7(b) shows our c mplete results when using
categorization plus reordering with respect to the number of categories used. Figure 7(c)
is a comparison between our approach with categorization plus reordering and Sun’s PDP.
The plot representing our approach is an average of the best and worst case we obtained
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from using different numbers of categories. The results obtained by this set of tests report
a very slight performance improvement due to the reordering.
Reordering rules is not a significant factor to performance because of the low number of
rules applicable to each subject. Reordering’s effect can be better appreciated for policy
sets with many rules applicable to each subject.
With regards to preprocessing, our results show that preproc ssing time is proportional
to the number of rules, as reported in Figure 7(d). Preprocessing a policy set of 100 policies
and 4000 rules while usingN categories takes about 25158 ms, and a policy set with 100
policies and 400 rules takes about 925 ms. WhenN/10 categories are used, preprocessing
times are lower, 23472 ms and 491 ms for the 4000-rule and 400-rule policy sets respec-
tively. Our tests also show that the preprocessing times areproportional to the number of
categories used. More categories lead to higher preprocessing times due to the extra pro-
cessing needed to match similar subjects to a common category. Next, we present a second
test suite highlighting the advantages of the reordering effect.
Test Suite II Results: We generated a second test suite that could allow us to observe the
impact of reordering on performance. This suite simulates ascenario where each subject
within a policy set is guaranteed to have a significant numberof applicable rules. This case
might occur when a specific subject has high privileges and has access to a high number of
resources. In this case the subject will have a high number ofrules permitting him access
to these resources.
When reordering happens in such a scenario, there will be no need to go over all rules
within a subject’s category. As expected, this test suite showed a significant performance
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Figure 8: Experimental Results for Test Suite 2.
advantage for the categorization plus reordering approachver the categorization only ap-
proach. We used policy sets of 4000, 2000, 1000, and 400 rules(different from the ones
used in first test suite). For each policy set, rules are divided evenly among 100 policies.
Overall, our results for this test suite show that our approach is 949 times faster than Sun’s
PDP engine. Similar to the first test suite, we conducted experiments using categorization
only and categorization with reordering.
Results with Categorization Only: The preprocessing timesfor this case are inline with
the times for the analogous set of tests of the first test suite. Pr cisely, when usingN
45
categories, preprocessing a policy set of 100 policies and 4000 rules takes about 25397 ms
and a policy set of 100 policies and 400 rules takes about 978 ms. WhenN/10 categories
are used, preprocessing times are 28633 ms and 1075 ms for the4000-rule and 400-rule
policy sets respectively.
As in the previous test case, the results for total processing times show a very significant
improvement in performance over Sun’s PDP. Our results indicate that our mechanism
provides at least 48 times faster evaluation. For a policy set of 100 policies and 4000 rules
while usingN/10 categories, it takes 2437.2 ms to evaluate 100,000 random requests,
whereas Sun’s PDP takes about 851477 ms. A policy set with 400rules takes 2272.2 ms
and Sun’s PDP takes about 120230.3 ms. ForN categories, total processing times are
2517.6 ms and 2242.5 ms for the 4000-rule and 400-rule policysets respectively.
Results with Categorization plus Reordering: Figure 8(a) repo ts the preprocessing times
for this approach. Our results show that preprocessing a policy set of 100 policies and
4000 rules while usingN categories takes about 25902 ms and a policy set with 100 poli-
cies and 400 rules takes about 1007 ms. WhenN/10 categories are used, preprocessing
times are 31052 ms and 1061 ms for the 4000-rule and 400-rule policy sets respectively.
Although the policies are different, we notice that the gathered times are very similar to
the times recorded for preprocessing the set of policies used for the first test suite (reported
in Figure 7(d)). This observation leads to the conclusion that e preprocessing time is
not influenced by the type of policies used. The preprocessing times are almost negligi-
ble when compared to the highly significant performance improvement in total processing
times over Sun’s PDP, not to mention that preprocessing times correspond to the setup stage
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of our framework which only occurs once within a policy set’slifetime or upon a client’s
request.
Figure 8(b) compares Sun’s PDP total evaluation times with our results from the second
test suite. The total processing time of our approach is at least 139 times faster than Sun’s
PDP. As shown, for a policy set of 100 policies and 4000 rules while usingN/10 cate-
gories, it takes 842.3 ms to evaluate 100,000 random requests, whereas Sun’s PDP takes
about 851477 ms. A policy set with 400 rules takes 867.5 ms andSun’s PDP takes about
120230.3 ms. WhenN categories are used, total processing times are 897.6 ms and830
ms for the 4000-rule and 400-rule policy sets respectively.
For the 4000-rule policy set used in this test suite, resultsindicate that categorization plus
reordering has a 65.4% performance improvement over using categorization alone. Figure
8(c) shows the performance boost reordering provides with respect to the number of cate-
gorizations used. The figure shows that adding reordering tocategorization provides over
1.6 seconds of an advantage over the use of categorization only.
We notice a slight improvement in performance when the number of categories is re-
duced. This result is explained by the fact that the policy set we used has many rules that
are applicable to all subjects, which means the resulting categories are not much different
from the original categories.
3.4.3 Adaptability of Reordering Approach
Figure 9, demonstrates how our reordering approach adapts to the incoming requests
received by the PDP. As mentioned earlier in the reordering approach, we have a reordering
process that reorders both policies within a PolicySet and rules within all policies. The
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Figure 9: Policy Order and Reordering Cycles
reordering happens according to the number of Permits/Denies a policy or rule triggers.
Figure 9 shows how the order of 10 policies within a PolicySetchanges with respect to
time. The orders of policies ranges from 0 toL[Pi], whereL[Pi] is the number of applicable
policies for subjectSi (The size of a subject’s policy execution vector). Order 0 reflects the
highest ranked policy (the policy most requested). Figure 9shows the policies within a
policy execution vector for a particular subject, in this cae subjectS1. It is important to
notice that each reordering cycle (a single reordering process) is dependent on all previous
cycles. In Figure 9,t0 represents the initial time before reordering, andtn represents the
time at whichn reordering cycles have been executed (reordering of policies/rules based
on the evaluation results attn−1, tn−2, . . . , t0). As time passes and more reordering cycles
occur, one can notice how the order of some policies starts tosettle at a certain position.
For instance, if one looks at policyP7, it gets pushed to order 9 att1, this is due to the low
number of Permits/Denies returned by this policy. Whereas if one looks at policyP0, it gets
to order 1 and stays there as it is requested very frequently.Po icyP4 settles aftert7. Other
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polices settle for a while and then get reordered as the incoming requests might influence
their order positions. The ordering of these policies depends on the incoming requests and
how they trigger the accumulated number of Permits/Denies apolicy evaluates to. Each
subject within a policy set will reflect a similar adaptationprocess to the one in Figure 9,
each of which prioritizes their applicable policies and rules according to the statistics from
previous reordering cycles.
To clarify how the adaptation process would actually occur,let us look into a case sce-
nario e.g. a school. At the beginning of a semester, most access requests would be driven
by students wanting to register for their courses. The adapttion process would move poli-
cies/rules that are applicable to students and favor their incoming requests to the top of
a policy set, which will result in faster evaluation times for such similar future requests.
Within a semester, where most midterms are given, many faculty requests for inserting or
updating student grades will be recorded. In this case, the adapt tion process will favor
faculty requests by moving policies/rules within a policy set to the top, and hence favoring
these requests. Whenever there is a flow of similar requests from different subjects within
the school, the policy set will adapt to the best configuration hat will result in the best
evaluation results.
Figure 10, demonstrates the average request evaluation times for subjectS1 with respect
to time. As the time proceeds, a number of reordering cycles occur, hence influencing the
order of subjectS1’s policies within its policy execution vector and rules within its rule
execution vector. The reordering process will push the mostrequested policies and rules
that evaluate to Permit/Deny up to the front of the corresponding execution vectors. This
will result in faster evaluation times as depicted by our test r ults in Figure 10. Note
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Figure 10: Average Request Evaluation Time and Reordering Cycles.
that the average request evaluation time gradually decreases as more reordering cycles are
executed and thus adapt to the incoming different request trnds.
CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATION MODELS FOR OPEN AUTHORIZATION
The Open Authorization protocol (OAuth) was introduced as aecure and efficient
method for authorizing third party applications without releasing a user’s access creden-
tials. However, OAuth implementations don’t provide the necessary fine-grained access
control, nor any recommendations i.e. which access controldecisions are most appropri-
ate. We propose an extension to the OAuth 2.0 authorization that enables the provision-
ing of fine-grained authorization recommendations to userswhen granting permissions to
third party applications. We propose a multi-criteria recommendation model that utilizes
application-based, user-based, and category-based collaborative filtering mechanisms. Our
collaborative filtering mechanisms are based on previous user decisions, and application
permission requests to enhance the privacy of the overall site’s user population. We imple-
mented our proposed OAuth extension as a browser extension that allows users to easily
configure their privacy settings at application installation time, provides recommendations
on requested privacy permissions, and collects data regardin user decisions.
4.1 Related Work
Developing usable tools that provide fine-grained control over user private data is an
emerging problem in online platforms especially within social networks [20, 2, 7, 24].
Studies such as the one by Acquisti and Gross [21, 2] indicateuser concern over their
privacy on social networks while most users did not apply strict privacy settings on their
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online social profiles. This was mostly due to the lack or poorunderstanding of what pri-
vacy controls are available to them. Felt et al. [13] detail anovel solution for protecting
privacy within social networking platforms through the useof an application programming
interface to which independent application owners would agree to adhere to. The approach
requires developers to adopt a privacy proxy instead of utilizing already existing technolo-
gies such as the popular OAuth 2.0 authorization flow. Recently Felt et al. reviewed the
permissions requested by current applications [15]. Whilesome of their findings apply to
the context of Android applications, they confirm that up-front permission requirements
for installation may help APIs achieve their full potentialin a secure fashion, while still be
useful for end-users. Fang and LeFevre’s work asserts the valu in providing highly accu-
rate privacy settings with reduced user input [12]. Using real user input, they infer a set of
privacy-preferences using a machine learning approach. While the authors’ study is based
on real users, they do not provide a technique that applies the inferred privacy settings onto
a user’s real online profile. Besmer et al. [6] demonstrated in their research the value of
social navigation cues in prompting users to make informed privacy decisions; where that
research was not concerned with the type of data and arbitrarily assigned a recommended
positive or negative cue for each item, our research is very specifically tied to data types and
our recommender model provides cues that are based on real user privacy decisions. While
much has been researched about the privacy impacts of recommender systems themselves
[56, 53, 8], little research appears to be available for the us of recommender systems in
aiding privacy and security systems. One notable exceptionis in the research of Kelly et
al. [33] where the authors demonstrated the benefit of combining collaboration among a
user population in the suggestion of an individual user’s privacy policy. They also propose
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an incremental model for optimizing a user’s policy over time. This approach is not op-
timal when dealing with third party applications, that onceinstalled, can harvest a user’s
private social network data. Shehab et al. [61] proposed an access control framework that
allows users to specify the data attributes to share with applications and the degree of speci-
ficity. The framework requires many changes to existing authorization models and requires
developers to go through a cumbersome deployment process.
4.2 Proposed OAuth Flow
We propose an extension to the OAuth 2.0 authorization code flw, by introducing two
new modules into the flow: 1) A Permission Guide that guides usrs through the requested
permissions, and shows them a set of recommendations on eachof the requested permis-
sions, and 2) A Recommendation Service that retrieves a set of r c mmendations for the
requested permissions following a collaborative filteringmodel as seen in Section 4.2.2.
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Our OAuth extension focuses on step “(A)” of the authorization code flow in OAuth
2.0 [52]. We revise step “(A)” to become a six stage process ashown in Figure 11 and
explained in the following steps:
A1: The client redirects the browser to the end-user authorization endpoint by initiating a
request URI that includes ascope parameter.
A2: The Permission Guide extension captures thescope value from the request URI and
parses the requested permissions. At this step the extension allows users to choose a subset
of the permissions requested.
A3: The Permission Guide extension requests a set of recommendations on the parsed
permissions. This is achieved by passing the set of permission to our Recommendation
Service.
A4: The Recommendation Service returns a set of recommendatio s for the permissions
requested by the client.
A5: Using the set of returned recommendations, the extension presents the permissions
with their respective recommendations in a user friendly manner.
A6: The Permission Guide extension redirects the end-user’s browser to a new request
URI with a new scope (scope’), assuming the user chooses to modify the requested
permissions.
4.2.1 Permission Guide
The Permission Guide is represented by a browser extension that integrates into the au-
thorization process by capturing thescope parameter value within the request URI gen-
erated by a third party application. Once thescope is captured, the extension parses the
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requested permissions and presents them in a user friendly manner as shown in Figure 16.
A readable label of each requested permission is shown to theend-user e.g. it shows “Face-
book Chat” rather thanxmpp login.
The extension also shows users a set of recommendations for the requested permissions.
For each permission there is a thumbs-up and thumbs-down recommendation value. These
recommendations represent prediction values that we calculate following our model in sec-
tion 4.2.2. These prediction values represent the likeliness of a user to grant or deny a
certain permission based on her previous decisions and on the collaborative decisions of
other users. Users who have not made any decisions yet, are shown recommendations
based on other user decisions.
The extension also allows users to customize the requested permissions by checking or
unchecking individual permissions, where a checked permission is one the user wishes to
grant to the third party application and an unchecked permission is one she wishes to deny
access to. Once a user decides on the permissions she wishes to gran and deny, she sim-
ply needs to click aSet Permissionsbutton on the extension (blue button in Figure 16).
This will trigger the extension to generate a new request URIwith a new scopescope’,
and forward the user’s browser to this new request URI.scope’ will always be a subset
of the original requested scope, i.e.scope’ ⊆ scope. An examplescope’ for the
FriendCameo application could be as follows:
scope’=publish stream
reflecting the user’s desire to allow FriendCameo to post to her feed/wall, but deny it ac-
cess to her email, Facebook chat and friend’s online/offlinepresence. Note that using a
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subset of the permissions requested could potentially hinder the functionality of a third
party application once installed.
Our Permission Guide extension also collects the user’s deci ions on the requested per-
missions, hence allows us to generate a data set of decisionsto be used in our recom-
mendation model explained in section 4.2.2. That is, our Recommendation Service as
seen in Figure 11 will utilize these decisions in making its recommendation predictions.
These decisions are uploaded to our servers once a user sets her desired permissions within
the extension, i.e. clicks theSet Permissionsbutton. The data uploaded to our servers in-
cludes:app id, requested perms, decisions, recommendations, where
theapp id is the application’s unique id which is assigned by the servic provider (e.g.
Facebook), therequested perms is the scope of permissions requested by the third
party application, thedecisions are the individual user decisions (grant or deny) on
each of the requested permissions, and therecommendations are the recommendation
values at the time the user made her decisions.
Our goal is to provide a simple user interface for interacting with permission requests,
hence increasing user awareness and providing an easy mechanism for guiding users in
making their decisions.
4.2.2 Recommendation Model
We propose a Recommendation Service component that extendsupon our Permission
Guide extension. LetA, U andP represent the set of applications, users and permissions
respectively. A userui ∈ U can make a decisiondi ∈ {grant, deny} on a permissionpj ∈
P for an applicationak ∈ A. An applicationak which requests permissionsp1, · · · , pm is
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mapped to a set of decisionsd1, · · · , dm made by the user installingak.
4.2.3 Collaborative Filtering
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Figure 12: Collaborative-based model
Our model follows the multi-criteria recommendation modelwhere user recommenda-
tions are calculated per criterion [38, 3]. The model utilizes the set of permissionsP as
a set of criteria, i.e. each permissionpj ∈ P represents an individual criterion within the
model. The multi-criteria approach fits our model as decision are made per permission
(criteria) rather than an application as a whole. We model a user’s utility for a given appli-
cation with the user’s decisionsd1, · · · , dm on each individual permissionp1, · · · , pm using
Function 1.
D : Users× Applications→ d1 × · · · × dm (1)
Function 1 represents a user’s overall decision on a certainapplication via the set of deci-
sions made on each individually requested permission. Thatis, userui makes a decision
di on an applicationak with respect to an individual permission. For each permission pj,
there exists a matrixCpj representing user decisions onpj for each applicationak ∈ A, see
Figure 13. A matrix entrydi with a value of1 denotes a user hasgrantedak the permission
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pj, whereas a0 denotes adeny. Entries with “?” values denote the user is yet to make
a decision on permissionpj for applicationak. Our model provides recommendations to
users that guide them in making these future decisions. Applications that do not request a
permissionpj have an empty entry inCpj and are handled properly in our implementation.
For example, letp1 = birthday, p2 = email, andp3 = location, where each represents
a single criterion within a three-criteria model. Letu1 = Alice who installed application
a1 that requests access to the permissionsbirthday, email, andlocation. As illustrated in
Figure 13, Alice has granteda1 the permissionsbirthdayand location (d1 = grant, d3 =
grant), whereas deniedemail (d3 = deny). Alice has yet to make a decision ona2 i.e.
a single decision on each requested permission∈ {birthday, email, location}. Our pro-
posed model utilizes the set of decisions for eachCpj , hence providing a recommendation
that fits each criterion.
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Figure 13: A three-permission (criteria) model
Figure 12 illustrates our overall collaborative model. Themodel relies on decisions
made by the community users, and utilizes them in building the multi-criteria matricesC
for each permission. By utilizing theC matrices, we generate two probability matrices,GA
andGU , as seen in Figure 12.GA is app-based, whereasGU is user-based.GA captures
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the probability of a certain application being granted a certain permission, whereasGU
captures the probability of a certain user granting a certain permission.
Figure 14 shows an exampleGA matrix, with a set of applications (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5),
permissions (birthday, email, location, sms, photos) and their corresponding
GA(j, k) values. For example,GA(location, a2) = 0.15, denotes a low probability of the
permissionlocation being granted to applicationa2 by users who installeda2. Our
proposed collaborative model adopts an item-based and user-ba d collaborative filtering
process. In our model, items are applications, hence we refer to item-based filtering as
application-based filtering. User-based filtering utilizes the user-based probability values
of GU , whereas application-based filtering utilizes the app-based probabilities ofGA as
seen in Figure 12.
 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 
birthday  0.6 0.75 1 0.2 0.3 
email 0 0.9 0.25 0.7 0.1 
location 1 0.15 0 0.35 0 
sms 0 0.4 0 1 0.5 
photos 0.2 0 0.6 0.25 0 
Applications 
P
e
rm
is
s
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n
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Figure 14: ExampleGA(j, k) values.
4.2.3.1 Application-based Filtering
Our application-based filtering process relies on the app-based probability values ofGA
shown in Figure 12. Each entryGA(j, k) in GA represents the overall probability of per-
missionpj being granted to applicationak.
To generate recommendations on the requested permissions,we first detect the nearest-
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neighbors for the target application requesting the permission . The nearest-neighbors in
app-based filtering are the applications most similar to thetarget application. Collabora-
tive filtering algorithms have mainly been based on one of twopopular similarity measures
namely the Pearson Correlation and Cosine-similarity [25,45]. We measure similarities
between applications using theGA values, and by calculating the Pearson correlation val-
ues between them. Equation 2 represents our application-based similarity measure, which
is the Pearson correlation value between applicationsai andaj , whereP is the set of all
permissions in our system andGA(ai) is the average probability for applicationai being
granted a permission inP.
sim(i, j) =
∑
∀p∈P
(GA(p, i)−GA(ai))(GA(p, j)−GA(aj))
√
∑
∀p∈P
(GA(p, i)−GA(ai))2
∑
∀p∈P
(GA(p, j)−GA(aj))2
(2)
Applications that don’t request a certain permissionpj have aGA(j, i) of zero. Appli-
cations which are similar and highly correlated, are those which request a similar set of
permissions, and have similarGA(j, i) values for each of their requested permissions. For
example, if both applicationsa1 anda2 requested the same set of permissions{p1, p2}, and
they have aGA(p1, a1) = GA(p1, a2) and aGA(p2, a1) = GA(p2, a2), thena1 anda2 are
considered highly correlated and their application-similarity valuesim(i, j) will be close to
1. When predicting recommendation values for permissions of applicationai, we make sure
they are based onai’s nearest neighbors, that is, the set of applications wheresim(ai, aj) is
highest. With application-based filtering, users collaborte towards increasing or decreas-
ing theGA(j, k) values, hence filtering applications according to the willingness of users
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to grant them certain permissions.
4.2.3.2 User-based Filtering
User-based filtering relies on theGU values, where each entryGU(j, k) in GU represents
the overall probability of permissionpj being granted by a focus useruk. Permission
recommendations in this case are based on the focus user’s nea est-neighbors, that is, the
users most similar to the focus user. Similar to application-based filtering, we use the
Pearson correlation to measure similarities between users. Equation 3 represents our user-
based similarity measure, which in terms is the Pearson correlation value between usersui
anduj, whereGU(ui) is the average probability of userui granting a permission inP.
sim(i, j) =
∑
∀p∈P
(GU(p, i)−GU(ui))(GU(p, j)−GU(uj))
√
∑
∀p∈P
(GU(p, i)−GU(ui))2
∑
∀p∈P
(GU(p, j)−GU(uj))2
(3)
With user-based filtering, a focus userui is given recommendations based on those users
most similar to him/her. Users with more similar probabilities of granting a certain per-
mission will be more similar, hence, potentially reflect a similar willingness to grant/deny
a certain permission.
We use both application-based and user-based filtering to calculate a recommendation
value on permissions requested by applicationai on behalf of userui.
4.2.4 Prediction Model
When a userui, say Alice, wants to install applicationak, we calculate a setRk, where
ri,j ∈ Rk is a prediction value for permissionpj requested byak. ri,j ∈ Rk is a prediction
of how likely Alice would be willing to grantpj to ak.
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The recommendation valueri,j is based on either our app-based filtering or user-based
filtering approaches. That is, the recommendations are eithr based onai’s nearest-neighbors
(most similar applications) orui’s nearest-neighbors (most similar users). Equations 4 and
5 show the recommendation value for app-based and user-based filtering respectively. Note
that we calculateri,j for eachpj requested by an applicationak.
ri,j = GA(pj) +
∑
a∈N sim(ak, a) ∗ dj,a
∑
a∈N |sim(ak, a)|
(4)
ri,j = GU(pj) +
∑
u∈N sim(ui, u) ∗ dj,ak
∑
u∈N |sim(ui, u)|
(5)
In Equation 4,GA(pj)) reflects the average probability that permissionpj is granted
over all applications inA, and is easily calculated via it’s corresponding row in theGA
matrix. Similarly, in Equation 5,GU(pj) represents the average probability that permission
pj is granted over all users inU , and is calculated via it’s corresponding row in theGU
matrix. Note that bothGA(pj)) andGU(pj) are driven by all users within our system. In
both equations,N represents the target application’s nearest-neighbors and the focus user’s
nearest-neighbors respectively. The size ofN depends on the similarity measures used, and
can be adjusted to follow a preset threshold within the impleentation, e.g. only include
neighbors with a similarity above0.8.
Finally, dj,a in Equation 4 representsui’s (focus user) previous decisions on permission
pj for each applicationa ∈ N . In Equation 5,dj,ak is a neighboring user’s decision onpj
for the focus applicationak. Note that thesim(ui, u) value will either increase or decrease
the effect of a neighboring user’s decision, based on how similar the neighboring user is
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to the focus user. Bothdj,a anddj,ai are captured via theCpj matrix explained earlier (see
Figure 13).
Notice that the prediction values calculated are based on a user’s previous decisions
and on the decisions of other users, hence capturing the essence of collaborative filtering.
In cases of insufficient data, prediction models could refrain from generating predictions,
or utilize collaborative filtering systems based on probabilistic, hybrid, or clustering ap-
proaches for generating predictions. We decided not to provide predictions in such cases.
4.2.4.1 Category-based Predictions
To further enhance the results of our recommendation predictions, we propose a category-
based model that takes into consideration an application’scategory. Example application
categories include Games, Utilities, Entertainment, etc.Categories can increase the pre-
cision of our predictions especially for applications thatrequest similar permissions for
different purposes. For example, two applications might request access to a user’s email
address, where the first application is a game and the second is a task manager. In this
example scenario, a user’s email could be used for differentpurposes, i.e. a task manager
could use it for sending reminder emails, whereas a game could use it to send promotions
for other games. A user would probably be more willing to grant email permission to the
task manager as it could be of more benefit to the user. Granting or denying a certain
permission will be driven by the user’s perception of the requested permission. We be-
lieve that similar permissions requested by apps within thesame category will be perceived
similarly by users. Hence, by providing recommendation predictions based on application
categories, we can reflect more precise user perceptions within our recommendations.
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Figure 15: Application category probability matrices
When generating category-based predictions, we follow a modified version of our ap-
plication based filtering model for calculating similarities. To calculate the set of nearest
neighbors for a certain applicationai, we only consider other applications that fall into
the same category asai. Figure 15 shows two probability matricesGAk andGAj , which
are extracted from the overallGA matrix explained previously.GAk andGAj represent
the permission probabilities for applications within the categoriesk and j respectively.
Let Ak ⊆ A be the set of applications that belong to categoryk, andNi be ai’s nearest
neighbors whereNi ⊆ Ak. Note thatai’s nearest neighbors can be found by calculating
the similarities betweenai and applications withinAk rather than all applications inA.
For example, in Figure 15, the nearest neighbors foray are found among the set of apps
{ax . . . ay}, and the similarities are calculated usingGAj . For applicationai ∈ A that
belongs to categoryk, we calculate recommendation predictions following Equation 6.
ri,j = GAk(pj) +
∑
a∈Ni
sim(ai, a) ∗ dj,a
∑
a∈Ni
|sim(ai, a)|
(6)
WhereGAk(pj) reflects the average probability that permissionpj is granted over applica-
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tions inAk, i.e. apps that fall withinai’s category. Category-based predictions are more
efficient in that they do not rely on all applications within our system, but rather on a
smaller subset of categorized applications. This allows for faster prediction calculations, in
addition to the potentially more precise recommendations.
4.3 Experiments
We evaluate our proposed OAuth 2.0 extension using Facebookas ur target platform.
Facebook is an ideal target given its large user base of over 800 million users, and its
extensive application directory of of over 7 million third party applications [11]. Facebook
is also one of the major platforms to adopt the OAuth 2.0 protoc l, which makes it a good
fit for our evaluation process. The proposed extension is notlimited to Facebook and can be
extended to other OAuth 2.0 platforms. To evaluate our proposed OAuth 2.0 extension, we
implemented two main components: a Permission Guide, and a Recommendation Service.
Permission Guide: Our proposed Permission Guide in section4.2.1 was implemented
as a browser extension for both Firefox and Chrome browsers,using a combination of
Mozilla’s XML User Interface Language, the Google Chrome browser APIs and Javascript.
Figure 16 shows the extension user interface for both Firefox and Chrome. Javascript was
used to interact with our back-end recommendation service API. The extension was tested
on the latest Firefox and Chrome browsers on Mac OS X 10.6/10.7, Linux CentOS and
Windows (Vista, 7) machines.
Once installed, the extension resides within the user’s browser and begins monitoring,
waiting for a Facebook application installation process tocommence. The extension does
not otherwise interfere with a user’s browsing experience.Once a Facebook application
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FireFox Extension UI Chrome Extension UI
Figure 16: Extension UI, Firefox and Chrome.
installation process is detected, the extension is activated nd presented to the user.
An installation process is detected by parsing the URLs a user vi its and searching for a
Permission Request. A Permission Requestfor Facebook applications can be identified by
locating the substringspermissions.requestand either ofacebook.com/connect/uiserveror
facebook.com/dialog/permissions.request. If a request is detected, the extension looks for
the type of request issued, i.e. Basic permission vs. Extended permission access. A basic
permission access request is identified by a missing or emptyscope attribute within the
URL. Otherwise, if thescope attribute is located, the extension recognizes that an extended
permission access request is in progress.
Recommendation Service: The service is a PHP based solutionrunning on Apache
2.2.14 with MySQL 5.1.5 as the data store solution. We run theservice on a desktop
machine running Linux CentOS, with 2GB RAM and a 2.0 GHz IntelX on CPU. The
recommendation service applies the recommendation based sch ma explained in section
4.2.2 by providing two private API methods which are used by our extension. The first API
method is thegetRecommendations method which accepts anapp id and a set of
requested permissions. It then returns a set of recommendatio s in a JSON format which
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maps a recommendation value to each permission. The second API method provided is the
postDecisions method which is invoked by our extension when a user makes herde-
cision on the requested permissions. This API method takes an app id, a set of requested
permissions, a set of user decisions on these permissions, and the set of recommendation
values displayed at decision time. These values are stored onto our recommendation back-
end server and used later in our recommendation based schema.
For our evaluation purposes, we are primarily focused on extended permission requests
because those are the permissions which are customizable byusers on the targeted platform
(Facebook). For basic permission requests, our extension notifies users that basic access is
requested, and no customization is possible. Whereas for extended permission requests our
extension performs the following:
1. Extracts the permissions requested by parsing thescope value from within the re-
quest URI. For Facebook, thescope value is a list of comma-delimited strings, each
string representing a certain requested permission.
2. Asynchronously retrieves recommendations for the set ofrequested permissions by
calling our API methodgetRecommendations. Once the recommendations are
retrieved, the extension UI is updated properly.
3. Dynamically generates the user interface to be shown to the user based on the re-
quested permissions and their respective recommendation values. Figure 16 shows
an example interface for
scope = publish stream, offline access, email, birthday
Once the user makes a decision on the permissions she would like to grant/deny by
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clicking the ”Set Permissions” button, the extension will perform two actions: 1)Invoke
our postDecisions API method passing along the user decisions. 2)Generate a new
scope value using the permissions granted by the user. Using this new scopescope’ the
user is then redirected to a customized application requestURI, resulting in a new Facebook
application permission request page. At this point the userhas defended herself against
unnecessary application accesses. Note that our approach prevents an application from
acquiring permissions before its actual installation. Thecurrent approach by Facebook
allows the removal of permissions only after applications are installed, which is realistically
not sufficient because applications have already acquired access to the data.
4.3.1 User Study
To evaluate our proposed framework, we perform a user study on our browser extension
FBSecure. The study’s main research questions were:1) Do permission recommenda-
tions (positive/negative) affect the user’s willingness to allow/deny permissions requested
by third party applications?and2) Are users more willing to share their friends’ privacy
attributes in comparison to their own?We use statistical measures to evaluate the success
of our proposed framework as discussed in Section 5.6.1.2.
4.3.1.1 Methedology
Our proposed browser extension is hosted under the name of FBSecure on the Mozilla
Add-Ons website (Firefox version) and, the Google Chrome web store website (Chrome
version). In addition, it was posted on our lab website (http://liisp.uncc.edu/
fbs). Twitter was also used as a means of recruiting participants for this study which was
approved by UNC Charlotte IRB (Protocol# 11-05-24). FBSecur was installed by over
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3528 Facebook users who installed over 1561 unique Facebookapplications. The results
summarized in this section are based on the population of users who installed our browser
extension, use Facebook, and sought out privacy extensions. Thi user sample is mainly
biased towards privacy aware users, but also includes regular users recruited via Twitter,
whom did not specifically seek out privacy extensions.
4.3.1.2 Study Results
We gathered over 7200 user decisions on 56 different Facebook extended permissions.
We evaluate our recommendation model based on the user decisions collected during the
usage of the extension. For every application permission request, our extension enabled
the collection of the details of the requested permission, the generated recommendation,
and the user selected permission settings. Figure 19, showst e probability of applications
requesting different permissions, for example we found that e most popular requested
permission is thepublish stream permission, which enables apps to post messages on
a user’s wall, and is requested by 42% of the Facebook apps. Other popular permissions
includeemail, offline access anduser birthday.
Over all our user population, Figure 17 shows how likely users were willing to grant
different permissions. Our results show that users have varying willingness towards dif-
ferent permissions, for example the likelihood of a user givin an application access to his
email is only 31%, while users are more likely to share their status (65%) with apps. Note
that some permissions requested give applications access to u er’s friends’ information, for
examplefriends location permission. To investigate the permissions that users are
more willing to grant on their friends’ data compared to their own data we conducted a
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Figure 17: Probability of Allowing a Requested Permission
t-test on the likely of allow statistic collected when usersare asked for permission to access
both their data and their friends’ data. With a significance leve of 5%, Figure 18 shows
the permissions for the hypothesis that users are more willing to share their friends data
is accepted. For example, it is statistically significant that users are more willing to share
with apps their friends’ birthday compared to their birthday.
Figure 20(a), summarizes the distribution of the number of permissions requested by
applications, with an average of 3.1 permissions requestedper application. Figure 20(b),
shows the average number of granted permissions for apps requesting permissions, and it
can be noted that on average applications are granted around44.7% of the permissions that
are requested. Figure 20(c), shows the distribution of number of applications by users who
installed the extension, on average the extension was used to install 5.2 applications.
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Attribute User (µ, σ) Friend (µ, σ) p-value
notes (0.42, 0.50) (0.98, 0.21) 0.0019
birthday (0.38, 0.45) (0.48, 0.46) 0.0123
location (0.38, 0.44) (0.57, 0.45) 0.0144
groups (0.57, 0.47) (0.75, 0.42) 0.0253
work history (0.45, 0.43) (0.58, 0.44) 0.0313
religion politics (0.56, 0.48) (0.71, 0.50) 0.0377
online presence (0.38, 0.42) (0.56, 0.49) 0.0456
events (0.51, 0.51) (0.60, 0.58) 0.0475
videos (0.58, 0.41) (0.61, 0.44) 0.0491
Figure 18: T-test user and friend permissions
The extension provides users with recommendations for eachof t e application re-
quested permissions. The recommendation is presented to the user as thumbs up and
thumbs down with their associated recommendation values based on the the recommender
models presented in previous sections. We are interested inevaluating whether the recom-
mender system properly predicts the user’s decision. Also we are interested in evaluating
what is the lowest (highest) recommendation value that willinfluence users into granting
(denying) a requested permission, we refer to this value as the thresholdT . Where users
said to be encouraged to grant the permission if the recommendatio is higher thanT and
to deny otherwise. In this case we have four possible outcomes for the recommended and
decided value, see Figure 21.
In literature there are several proposed metrics for evaluating recommender system per-
formance, we focus on the most adopted metrics in literaturewhich are based on three
measures namely accuracy, precision and recall [26]. Accura y of the recommender sys-
tem is the degree of closeness of the recommender system to the actual decision taken by
the user, which is calculated as TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
. The precision or the repeatability of the
recommender system, is a measure of the degree to which repeated r commendations un-
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Figure 19: Probability of Requesting a Permission
der the similar conditions generate the same results, whichis omputed as TP
TP+FP
. The
recall or sensitivity is a measure of the ability of the recommender system to select in-
stances of either to recommend or not, which is computed as,TP
TP+FN
. Figure 22, shows
the accuracy, precision and recall calculated for different threshold values. The experiments
were conducted to evaluate the proposed application based,u r based and category based
recommendation models. The application and category basedpproaches maintained an
accuracy of over 90%. The category based approach provided the highest accuracy, this is
due to the refined application similarity value as apps in a given category provide a better
context for providing recommendations for apps from the same category. The precision
and recall are inversely proportional with a break even region around the threshold value of
45%, which could explain that the recommendation value of 45% or higher is an indication
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Figure 20: Permission Probability Profiles
that the system is recommending to grant the requested permission, and lower than 45% is
recommending to deny the permission. Also note that the system achieves a precision and
recall values of 92-85% and 75-85% around this threshold.
In addition to investigating the accuracy, precision and recall measures we further inves-
tigated the causality of our recommendation scheme. That is, re users less likely to grant
permissions when using the recommendation based scheme. Toinvestigate, our browser
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Figure 21: Classification based on user decisions
extension was designed to accommodate two groups of users. The first group (G1), are
users who were not shown the recommendation values (see Figure 23). The second group
(G2), are users who were shown the recommendation values genrat d by the recommenda-
tion system (see Figure 24). The extension randomly selected us rs who belonged in each
of the groups. For each group we recorded the users’openness, which is the percentage of
granted permissions for each application installed.
The average user openness of G1 and G2 were 66.5% and 30.7% respectively, which
indicates that users who were not presented with the recommendation were more likely to
grant permissions to applications. To compare the two groups we performed a T-test of the
hypothesis to investigate the following question, “on averg , are users in G2 less open than
users in G1?”. Using the collected data, with a significance lev l of 5% this hypothesis was
accepted (P-Value of 0.0001). These results show that the users who were presented with
the recommendation values were less open to granting permissions to applications. The
results presented in this experiment are based on the average openness values calculated
over all installed apps in both groups. Figure 25, shows the exp cted openness for the two
groups for specific permissions for which the hypothesis wasaccepted.
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Figure 22: Recommendation system accuracy, precision and recall evaluation
Figure 23: Group (G1) with no recommendations shown
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Figure 24: Group (G2) with recommendations shown
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CHAPTER 5: 3RD PARTY BROWSER EXTENSION POLICY MANAGEMENT
Today’s online activities such as social networking, banking and other daily online ac-
tivities have increased the users’ online presence and madethe browser a main portal for
users. Users are increasingly enriching their browsing experience with third party applica-
tions that provide new functionalities and improve upon existing ones. Third party browser
extensions are popularly used by millions of users [50, 66],especially with their wide
availability on online portals such as Google’s Chrome Web Store.
Regardless of the popularity and benefits of third party browser extensions, they could
potentially threat the privacy of their users. This lead platforms such as Google Chrome to
introducing permission models that control third party extension accesses, especially those
regrading sensitive user data. These models allow developers to declare the permissions
their extensions require. Extension users on the other handare responsible for making
their own access control decisions on requested permissions. Users are usually warned of
requested permissions and provided with brief descriptions on what they mean.
Existing browser permission models suffer from limitations when it comes to protecting
user privacy against 3rd party extensions. Limitations mainly involve insufficient access
control techniques, and limited user awareness. Some browse s provide an Incognito mode
that disables 3rd party extensions by default. For example,Google Chrome allows users
to enable/disable extensions in this mode, but lacks fine-grain permission customization.
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In this work we analyze the Google Chrome permission model for 3rd party extensions
and discuss some of its limitations, in addition to some potential threats on user privacy
under Chrome. We propose a runtime framework that improves upon the existing Chrome
extension permission model. The framework contributes thefollowing:
• Runtime API Monitoring: Chrome extension APIs are monitored in runtime, which
increases the user’s awareness by informing them of API accesses at the moment
they occur.
• Fine-grained Runtime Access Control: The proposed framework gives users the ca-
pability to customize extension permissions. Users can deny/allow an individual
permission and its associated APIs. Users are also able to prevent APIs of specific
permissions from accessing certain webpages they visit. E.g., users can prevent ex-
tensions from reading the URL of their banking website, eventhough the extension
was originally granted permission to do so.
• A Chrome extension called “REM” that implements the proposed framework. The
extension provides users a simple user interface for monitori g extension accesses,
customizing their extension permissions, and getting details on requested permis-
sions as seen in Figure 28, 29, & 30.
• Finally, we conduct a user study that evaluates our Chrome extension “REM” and fo-
cuses on measuring REM’s effect on user awareness towards extension permissions.
5.1 Related Work
In the last few years several extension vulnerabilities have been discovered, which in-
clude stealing cookies, key logging, expose confidential information, and hijack the local
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operating system [14, 75, 5, 65]. In a white paper, Freeman etal. [41] investigated the
possible security attacks on Firefox extensions.
Bandhakavi et al. [4], proposed applying static information-flow analysis to the JavaScript
code used in the third party applications. They described a set of unsafe flow patterns that
may lead to security vulnerabilities. This approach provides a mechanism to query the
extension code for the defined unsafe flows and does not provide a mechanism to enable
the user to monitor application behavior and control its access. Similarly static analysis
[42] has been proposed to address security of web applications such as identifying SQL
injection [72], and cross-site scripting [43, 69].
Dynamic analysis techniques have also been used to trace information flow properties of
JavaScript as it is being executed by the browser [35, 75]. Dhawan et al. [9] proposed a
memory tainting approach to trace propagation of tainted objects during JavaScript execu-
tion and to raise alerts if an object containing sensitive information is accessed in an unsafe
way. These approaches are effective in tracing dynamic program flow, however usually
require users to install a modified or recompiled browser or JavaScript engine.
5.2 Chrome Extension Permissions
Third party Chrome extension developers are able to declarepe missions needed by
their extensions to fulfill certain functionalities, and toaccess certain Chrome APIs. Such
permissions can be declared as required using thepermissions manifest property. For
example, an extension might request access to browser cookies, r a user’s browsing history
in order to interact with their associated Chrome APIs. The set of such possible permis-
sions are defined by Google within the Chrome extension API documentation. Developers
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can also declare permissions as optional, which is ideal forpermissions not required imme-
diately by extensions. Additional permissions can also be requested by an extension when
updated.
5.2.1 Permissions and Chrome APIs
Once an extension acquires its requested permissions, it can access the Chrome APIs
associated with each permission, i.e, certain Chrome APIs requi e certain permissions to
execute successfully. For example, thechrome.cookies.get API call requires the
cookies permission. We look at each requested permission, and find all the reachable
API calls an extension can perform, which allows us to precisely monitor all potential ex-
tension accesses, as explained in our proposed framework inSection 5.4. The full permis-
sion to API mappings were generated by scanning the Chrome extension documentation,
specifically the manifest permissions and their associatedchrome modules. By mapping
each permission to a set of associated API calls, we can control and monitor an extension’s
specific accesses. The exception to this rule is any extension u ng an NPAPI plugin, which
allows for native code execution outside of the context of the Chrome browser. That is,
NPAPI accesses do not occur through the Chrome APIs.
5.2.2 User Awareness
Users are warned about some of the permissions that are request d at installation time,
and have the option to either continue installing an extension with the requested permis-
sions, or cancel the installation process. Warnings are also shown to users if a certain
extension is updated and requests additional permissions,or if an optional permission is
being requested. Note that not all permissions trigger a warning message. Such permis-
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sions will be granted to an extension without the user’s explicit approval. An example of
such permissions iscookies. We think the rational behind this is that these permissions
rely on other requested permissions that do trigger warnings. For example, an extension
that requests thecookies permission can only access cookies for the hosts it has access
to. The list of hosts that can be accessed by a certain extension are listed within its mani-
fest file as part of the permissions attribute, and are shown tthe user at install time. The
caveat here is that not all users will presume giving access to a certain host could also lead
to granting access to its cookies. For example, if a user grants ccess to<all urls>
(all urls), this could potentially mean access to all cookies in the user’s browser. Another
Figure 26: Permission details in the Standard method
issue involves warnings that do not reflect a precise description of what is being granted
to an extension. For example, an extension that requests thehistory permission will
trigger a warning that says “It can access: Your browsing history”, which could potentially
be misinterpreted as the list of all URLs a user has visited. But the matter of fact is that
thehistory permission also provides an extension with information rega ding a user’s
browsing behavior, e.g. how the user reached a certain website (by typing the url, click-
ing a link, via a bookmark, etc.), the time they visited a website, and the number of visits
too. Such information can be valuable to third parties and could potentially be used for
undesired purposes from a user’s point of view. In our proposed framework, we provide
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users with detailed information and feedback on the permission and accesses granted to
an extension as seen in Figure 28 and 30. Currently, the “Standard” method for discovering
an extension’s permissions is to visit it’s page on the Chrome Web Store and looking at the
details tab as seen in Figure 26. From there, users have the opion to discover more about
the permissions requested by visiting yet another webpage.In Section 5.6 we show that our
proposed extension REM performs better in increasing user awa eness and understanding
of an extension’s permissions.
5.2.3 Permission Dependency
Extension permissions sometimes rely on other permissions, i.e. it is not sufficient
for an extension to request one permission without the other. H nce, certain functional-
ities within an extension will require a chain of permissions to execute successfully. A
Chrome API Direct Indirect
cookies.get
cookies host
cookies.remove
cookies.set
cookies.getAll
cookies.getAllCookieStores
cookies.onChanged
tabs.captureVisibleTab tabs host
tabs.executeScript
Table 1: API Direct and Indirect Permissions
popular permission requested by extensions is thehost permission, which is declared
within the manifest as a match pattern. The pattern dictatesth hosts that are accessible
by extensions. Example patterns include:http://*/* (all hosts using the http scheme),
http://example.com/foo.htmlwhich matches that specific url, and<all urls>
which matches all urls. The importance of theost permission emerges when extensions
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use other permissions such as thecookies or tabs. For example, an extension may re-
questcookies permission and assume it can read all cookies using thecookies.getAll
API. This isn’t true, unless the extension requested ahost permission that covers all URLs
associated with the desired cookies. Figure 1 shows an example set of APIs and the various
permissions required to use them. Two types of permissions are hown, direct and indirect.
Direct permissions are immediately associated with the APImethod, whereas the indirect
ones are additional required permissions. By understanding these dependencies our pro-
posed framework can better monitor and control the specific accesses made by extensions.
5.3 User Privacy and Threats
Users have widely adopted browser extensions and have become acclimated to using
them on a regular basis. With this wide spread of extensions,especially ones developed
by third parties, the threats to user privacy have increased[14, 75, 5, 65]. The permission
model adopted by Google Chrome does provide some means for controlling the permis-
sions given to extensions, but there are still areas that canbe improved to provide for better
privacy and protection against potential threats.
5.3.1 Threats
Extensions with excessive permissions represent a higher thr at to user privacy, espe-
cially those that are poorly written and include security vulnerabilities. Excessive per-
missions are those that are deemed inappropriate or unnecessary in certain privacy re-
lated scenarios. For example, granting ahost permission of<all urls> to a Twitter
client extension could be deemed excessive, as it most likely would only require access to
http://*.twitter.com/*. In the following, we discuss some potential threats when
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extensions gain excessive Chrome permissions.
Host Permissions: Thehost permission is a popular permission requested by third
party extensions and is declared as a match pattern within the extension’s manifest. The
match pattern represents the webpages extensions would like to access, which could range
from a specific webpage (by specifying a specific URL) to all webpages with a schema of
http, https, file, or ftp (Using the<all urls>). Figure 2 shows the requested
host permission patterns requested by the top hundred ratedex nsions on the Chrome Web
Store. The most popular patterns requested where thehttp://*/* andhttps://*/*
patterns. Note that the occurrences of match patterns do notsum up to 100, that is because
extensions can declare multiple patterns. Extensions withexcessive host permissions could
Host Pattern Occurrences (100)
<all urls> 5
*://*/* 4
https://*/* 38
http://*/* 46
Wild Card Subdomain 18
Specific Host 12
Table 2: Host permission patterns requested by the top 100 rated extensions
potentially succeed in performing attacks on user privacy,especially when combined with
other permissions such as theabs or cookies permission. With thetabs permission,
extensions are able to programmatically execute their own custom JavaScript using the
chrome.tabs.executeScript API. Such scripts are allowed to run on webpages
that satisfy the extension’shost permission. Hence, with an excessivehost permission,
custom scripts are executed on a wider range of webpages. Thethreats on user privacy
arise when custom scripts are vulnerable to attacks such as Cros Site Scripting, that is, a
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script could potentially execute malicious code embedded within webpages visited by the
user. Such a scenario would allow the malicious code to perform with the privileges of the
compromised extension. For example, malicious code could access all cookies accessible
to a compromised extension that hascookies permission. Limiting thehost permission
to a smaller subset of webpages would decrease the attack surface.
Thecookies permission combined with excessivehost permissions could also in-
troduce threats to user privacy. Access to cookies is based on thehost permission an
extension has, that is, access is allowed to any cookie that belongs to a host within the
match pattern declared by theost permission. Hence, a match pattern of<all urls>
potentially means access to all user cookies. Extensions could abuse theirhost permis-
sion and access user cookies for malicious reasons such as hijacking a user’s online session.
Another threat scenario involves vulnerable extensions that have thecookie permission.
Such extensions, if attacked, could elevate the privilegesof malicious code and allow it
access to user cookies and other reachable resources.
The dependencies between thehost and bothtabs andcookie permissions makes
it important to monitor and control the specific accesses made by extensions, especially
when dealing with excessivehost permissions such ashttp://*/* or <all urls>.
The rationale is that extensions may need different host permissions for different types of
accesses. For example, executing a script using thetabs.executeScriptAPI may re-
quire certainhost permissions, whereas reading cookies via thec rome.cookies.get
API may require different ones. Currently, the samehost permission is used for both pur-
poses, which leads to unnecessary privileges and potentially unwanted accesses.
Tabs Permission: Thetabs permission gives extensions access to the browser’s win-
85
dows and tabs within each open window. Extensions are able toaccessTab objects, which
contain information on the tab returned such as the associated URL. hence, extensions with
tabs permission have access to all URLs a user visits. Note that the abs permission
is not dependent on thehost permission with the exception of content script execution,
hence, Chrome does not prevent access to tab URLs that are notwithin thehost match
pattern. With access to all URLs, a malicious extension can directly analyze any URL
and its query attributes, and potentially extract important information such as session IDs
and OAuth request tokens. Such information can be used in compro ising the user’s pri-
vacy [51].
Another drawback of not bounding thetabs permission, is that it undermines the
history permissions defined by Chrome. That is, extensions can generat their own
history repository by keeping track of all URLs users visit.Note that thehistory permis-
sion provides additional accesses such as the methodology of reaching a certain webpage
(e.g. was a URL typed, clicked, etc.), hence we only considerthis a partial undermining.
We improve upon thetabs permission within our proposed framework by allowing users
to customize the URLs accessible by APIs associated to thetabs permission.
Other Permissions: Other Chrome permissions such as thehistory & bookmarks
permission could also be used to gain access to URL data, hence potentially executing
malicious attacks using extracted session IDs or OAuth request tokens. Such attacks may
frequently fail given history and bookmark URLs are potentially old, hence contain out-
dated information regarding a user’s session or request token. Note that both these permis-
sions are not bounded by theost permissions. We also improve upon this within our
framework.
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5.3.2 Intrusiveness
Third party extensions that request excessive permissionsca be quite intrusive. This
is mainly due to the relatively course-grain nature of Chrome permissions. For example,
extensions with thetabs permission are able to track all URLs a user visits, which in
many cases is undesirable, especially in scenarios where uss visit webpages of highly
confidential matter, such as financial or health related webpages. Thetabs permission also
gives extensions access to the DOM, which gives it the ability to read and write data within
the DOM. Such data may be highly confidential. For example, anextension withtabs
permission can easily detect if a user has visitedhttps://online.wellsfargo.com/and extract
the user’s balance. With additional permissions, the extension could even pass it back
to a remote server. Such scenarios show the importance of giving the user the necessary
controls over which webpages certain extensions have access to. Other permissions such as
history andbookmarks could also reveal the browsing behaviors of users. We believe
users should have the option to control the accesses associated with these permissions. With
the potential threats and lack of sufficient user awareness within the Chrome extension
permission model, we propose a runtime framework that monitors and informs users of
extension accesses, in addition to providing them the meansfor controlling and customizing
the permissions granted to their installed extensions.
5.4 Proposed Permission Framework
We propose and implement a runtime permission framework that allows for fine grain
chrome permission monitoring and access control enforcement. The framework monitors
Chrome API calls made by third party extensions and collectsthe data processed by these
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calls. For example, when the APIchrome.windows.getAll is called, an allocated
monitor within our framework collects the information relevant to the returned browser
windows, such as the set of all Tabs within each of the browserindows. Given the runtime
Chrome
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Figure 27: Framework Architecture
nature of the framework, it can inform users in realtime of the specific accesses made
by extensions (e.g. which specific URLs or cookies it has accessed), it can also enforce
fine-grain access control onto attempted accesses. Additionally, the proposed framework
allows for users to customize extension permissions, i.e. grant/deny permissions from the
original set requested by an extension. The framework consists of two main components,
the extension Manager, and extension Monitor. A single Monitor is allocated for each third
party extension installed on a user’s Chrome browser, and has its own associated access
control Policy. All Monitors report back and are managed by the framework’s extension
Manager. Figure 27 illustrates the overall architecture ofour framework.
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5.4.1 Extension Manager
Our extension Manager is the main component within our framework that allows for
monitoring third party extensions. The extension manager its lf is a Chrome extension with
NPAPI capabilities. NPAPI access allows us to adapt the behavior of third party extensions
and allow the extension manager to listen to Chrome API callsmade by these extensions,
in addition to enforcing fine-grain access controls on requested accesses. In the following
we discuss the tasks covered by the Manager.
Adapting Third Party Extensions: To monitor API calls made by third party extensions,
the manager modifies their default behavior by injecting a proposed Monitor component
that reports back to the manager. Figure 27 shows the MonitorM1 that is assigned to
Extension1. This is achieved by including a custom builtmonitor.js script file into
the extension’s bundle, then linking to it from within the ext nsion’s HTML pages such
asbackground.html andpopup.html. When building the Monitor for a specific
extension, the manager can selectively choose which API calls the Monitor should monitor.
This allows for optimizing the monitoring process and avoiding unnecessary checks. For
example, in Figure 27, only API callsc2 andc3 are monitored forExtension1. We
explain the details of our Monitor component in Section 5.4.2.
Figure 28: API Call Notification Example
API Notifications and Logging: Once a Monitor is built and injected into an extension’s
bundle, the Manager starts listening to incoming message calls sent by the Monitor. These
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messages hold information on the Chrome API calls made by third party extensions. Using
this information, the manager is able to keep users aware of the extension activities by
notifying them in real time of the API calls made as seen in Figure 28. The Manager also
logs all accesses for future reference and are accessible via the Manager’s UI.
Fine-Grain Permission Customization: The Manager allows for users to customize the
access control policy for each installed extension. Users are given fine-grain controls over
the permissions granted to extensions and are provided witha simple user interface to do
so as seen in Figure 29. There are mainly two types of permission controls provided:
1. Permission-based: These controls allow users to deny or allow certain permission
as a whole. Doing so prevents any API associated with the permission from ex-
ecuting. For example, users can choose to deny the permission co kies for an
extension which will block all cookie associated Chrome APIs from executing.
2. Host-based: These controls allow/deny extensions from accessing certain hosts via
the APIs of a certain permission. That is, we keep track of apermission-to -host
dictionary that has all the hosts blocked for each permission of an extension. For
example, a user could prevent an extension withtabs permission from accessing a
Tab that is associated with a certain host such asonline.wellsfargo.com. We
provide host-based controls for thetabs, cookies,history, andbookmarks
permissions. Host-based controls allow for decreasing theeffect of excessivehost
permissions and the potential threats discussed in Section5.3.
Users are also given the option to fully enable/disable certain extensions.
Extension Policy: Each third party extension is allocated apolicy.js file which rep-
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Figure 29: Permission Customization
resents its access control Policy. The policy contains the fin -grain decisions made by
users via thePermission-basedandHost-basedcontrols. That is, it contains a set of denied
Chrome permissions in addition to a set of deniedp rmission-to-hostvalues. This Policy is
used by an extension’s Monitor to make the proper access control decisions whenever a cer-
tain API call is detected. Any customizations made by the user ar immediately registered
by the Manager and written into the extension’s Policy. Notethat the Policy represents a
negative access control list (ACL−), hence if a Chrome permission orpermission-to-host
value does not exist within the Policy, it is considered allowed, otherwise it is denied. Also
note that thepolicy.js is embedded within an extension’s bundle. Figure 27 shows the
PolicyP1 that is assigned toExtension1.
Figure 30:tabs permission details
Permission Details: The Manager finally provides users witha detailed description on
each of the requested permissions. The detailed description for a specific permission also
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contains a set of examples on popular accesses that map to theChrome APIs associated
to a permission. We manually prepared the descriptions and examples. We evaluate the
effectiveness of these detailed descriptions in our user study as explained in Section 5.6.
Figure 30 shows the detailed description for theabs permission.
5.4.2 Extension Monitor
An extension Monitor is a custom built JavaScript file (monitor.js) that we use to
monitor the activities of third party extensions. When a Monit r is created for a specific ex-
tension, it is assigned a set of API methods to monitor. TheseAPIs are assigned by our ex-
tension Manager to suit the permissions requested by extensions. For example, if an exten-
sion requests thecookies permission, the monitor would be asked to monitor the corre-
sponding cookie API methods:chrome.cookies.[getAllCookieStores, get,
getAll, remove, set, onChanged]. Note that the Manager could select a subset
of these APIs, but we monitor all associated APIs by default.
The Monitor is also assigned a Policy (policy.js) which it uses in making access con-
trol decisions on the API calls it detects. When relevant APIcalls are detected by a Monitor,
the following steps occur:
1. The Monitor intercepts the API call, i.e. the execution ofthe API runs through the
Monitor. It then informs the Manager of this call.
2. An access control decision is made on the API call. This is decided based on two
factors. First, the Chrome permission the API is associatedto. If this permission is
in theACL− of the Monitor’s Policy, the decision is rendered as Deny. Second, the
host used within the API (if applicable). If apermission-to-hostvalue is found for the
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associated permission of the API, the decision is rendered as Deny. If either factors
render a decision of Deny, then the final decision is Deny, otherwise it is Allow.
3. If the Policy decision retrieved is Allow, the Monitor executes the API call and returns
the relevant results. Otherwise, if the decision is Deny, then t e API is blocked and if
appropriate returns an empty result (Some extension requird an empty result to not
break).
Figure 31 illustrates the previous access control process flow. Note that in cases of APIs that
Extension Monitor
API Call
Execute API
API Result
[Decision == Permit]
Block/Empty Result
[Decision == Deny]
getPolicy
Decision
Policy
(ACL
-
)
Figure 31: Access Control Sequence
do not specify a specific host value such aschrome.windows.getAll, the Monitor
will filter the return values to not include any results associated with apermission-to-host
value. For example, if the user has denied the hostonline.wellsfargo.com and the
chrome.windows.getAll API results includes Tab objects associated with this host,
then the results returned will exclude these Tabs.
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5.5 Evaluation
The framework was evaluated on a Windows 7 machine with a 2.4GHz i3 CPU, 4GB
of RAM, and was running the Chrome browser version16.0.912.75. In our evaluation, we
studied the 100 “top rated” Chrome extensions as listed on the official Chrome Web Store
at the time of evaluation. The extensions covered all categori s n the Chrome Web Store.
5.5.1 Implementation
To evaluate the proposed framework, we implemented the framework as a Chrome exten-
sion with NPAPI capabilities and used the FireBreath NPAPI Framework [16] to develop
thedll plugin used for the extension. For parsing themanifest.json files of each
extension, we used the Cajun JSON parser. Our Monitor component of the framework
was implemented using the FunMon2.js function monitor [62], which allowed us to mon-
itor API calls from within an extension’smonitor.js file. We used Chrome’s message
passing APIs to establish the connections between the Manager and Monitor components,
specifically theonRequestExternal. addListener andsendRequest APIs.
When users install our implemented extension, they are required to restart their browser
to initiate the adaptation process on their installed extensions. At this point, the framework
starts the monitoring process and access control enforcement. The main user interface was
implemented via the extension’s browser action and itspopup.html. The browser action
button shows the user the number of recent API notifications.Thepopup.html will dis-
play the recent notifications and the permission customization controls as seen in Figure 28
and 29. Users can also see a detailed activity log when clicking the Activity button of an
extension, and can choose to enable/disable the extension.Finally, popup.html shows
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users the list of originally requested host permissions.
5.5.2 Permission Requests
In Section 5.3, we discussed theost permissions requested by the the evaluated exten-
sions as seen in Table 2. Table 3 shows the list of permissions(excludinghost) requested
by the evaluated extensions and the frequency of each. It also shows the permissions sup-
ported by our framework. We notice that theabs permission is the most popular followed
by thecontextMenus andcookies permissions.
Permission Frequency (100) Supported
tabs 77 YES
contextMenus 22 YES
cookies 11 YES
notifications 10 NO
unlimitedStorage 9 NO
bookmarks 6 YES
plugin 4 NO
management 4 YES
idle 4 YES
geolocation 2 NO
history 2 YES
proxy 1 YES
clipboardWrite 1 YES
Table 3: Frequency of Requested Permissions
From the 100 extensions, we analyzed the combinations oftabs andhost permissions
requested. As discussed in Section 5.3, with both these permissions, extensions could rep-
resent a potential threat on user privacy. We found that 6.5%of extensions with thetabs
permission have requested a< ll urls> host permission, 5% with*://*/*, 49%
with https://*/*, and 60% withhttp://*/*. Whereas, 12% have either requested
a specific host or ones with wild card subdomains. We also found that 11% have nohost
permissions. Note that the percentages do not add up to 100% because of extensions that
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use multiple host match patterns.
5.5.3 Real World Evaluation
Using our proposed runtime framework, we were able to successfully monitor and en-
force our fine-grain permission controls in real time. This included all APIs for supported
permissions within our framework. We discuss unsupported permissions in Section 5.5.3.2.
To evaluate our framework on real world extensions, we installed and used the 100 top
rated extensions with our framework in place. We manually analyzed the JavaScript code
of each extension to make sure our usage covered all execution paths. The framework
was successful in monitoring the APIs excluding those of unsupported permissions. Note
that the framework was also capable of supporting event listeners, which was achieved via
monitoring the callback functions of events.
5.5.3.1 Performance Evaluation
As a runtime framework it was important to measure the monitori g overhead introduced
when adapting third party extensions to our framework. We measure the time to execute
some of the popular APIs with and without our framework in place. These APIs were
popular amongst the evaluated extensions. Table 4 shows theresults of the evaluation when
our framework is disabled and enabled. We believe the overhead is acceptable for most
chrome extension functionalities, and will not interfere with the usability of extensions.
5.5.3.2 Coverage and Limitations
The proposed framework was able to successfully monitor andenforce fine-grain access
controls onto 87% of the evaluated extensions. It failed in cases where extensions had
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API Disabled Enabled (ms)
tabs.onUpdated.addListener 0.45 ms 2.7 ms
tabs.sendRequest 2.2 ms 6 ms
cookies.set 2 ms 4.5 ms
cookies.get 1 ms 4 ms
Table 4: Framework monitoring overhead for popular API calls
unusual manifest files, that is, not strictly following the traditional manifest guidelines. It
also failed in cases where JavaScript errors occurred within an extension’s code. As part of
our future work, we will further enhance the framework’s compatibility and error handling
in such non-traditional cases.
The framework is also limited to which Chrome permissions itcan monitor and control.
These permissions are mostly related to APIs that run outside he context of Chrome, e.g.
plugin APIs, and HTML5 APIs. The supported include:background, contentSettings,
experimental, fileBrowserHandler, geolocation, notifications, andunlimitedStorage. Note
that our framework only enforces theHost-basedcontrols on the following permissions:
tabs, bookmarks, cookies, and history. These are the permissions we believe are most
relevant to webpages a user visits. As part of our future work, we will further investigate
support for additional permissions.
5.6 User Study
To evaluate our proposed browser extension we conducted a user study that compares
the Standard permission discovery method (By visiting an extension’s detail page on the
Chrome Web Store) with our own browser extension REM. Participants in the study per-
formed a number of tasks related to third party Chrome extensions and answered a number
of questions on these tasks. The study was approved by UNC-Charlotte IRB (Protocol
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#12-02-50).
5.6.1 Methodology
The study participants were recruited from UNC-Charlotte and were all UNC-Charlotte
students. Each participant was supplied with a $10 Amazon gift card. We recruited a
total of 20 participants to start the study, of which 18 successfully completed the study
and 2 dropped out. Of the 18 participants, 11 were females and7 were males. 88.2% of
the participants are at least familiar with Chrome extensios. Participants where given a
brief introduction to REM’s and to the existing Standard methods, and were also given a
few minutes to familiarize themselves with both techniques. We then performed a within-
subjects study comparison in which participants use eitherthe Standard method or REM
for performing the study tasks at first, then use the other method for performing the same
tasks once again. Assigning a method (REM or Standard) to users was random, and the
order of the methods assigned was counter balanced.
5.6.1.1 Study Tasks
Participants were given 8 different tasks and were asked to determine whether perform-
ing a certain action was permitted by a third party Chrome extnsion. For these tasks,
participants could answer with: Yes, No, or Uncertain. Notethat for each task a participant
had to answer in regards to four different third party extensio .The tasks were categorized
into Social Networking related tasks and Online Shopping related ones. For each category
participants performed 4 different tasks. Examples of suchtasks are illustrated in Figure
32.
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Category Task
Social Networking Do the installed browser extensions have permission
to read your private posts on social sites you visit?
Online Shopping Do the installed browser extensions have permission
to read your history of visited product pages?
Figure 32: Example Tasks
5.6.1.2 Study Results
To evaluate the performance of participants on tasks, we considered two measures: 1)Re-
sponse correctness, and 2)The time to finish a task measured in s conds. In Figure 33 we
summarize the different time intervals for finishing correctly answered tasks. Notice that
we consider only the correctly answered tasks as we are interested in the time it takes to
correctly determine permitted actions among third party Chrome extensions.
One can notice an overall higher accuracy rate when using REM, in addition to an overall
lower time-to-task intervals. For example, participants were able to answer 30 tasks cor-
rectly within a time interval of 0-25 seconds using REM, whereas with the Standard method
they were able to answer 12. Surprisingly, even when REM was the first tool option used
by participants, it was still able to perform relatively better than the Standard method.
To measure the significance of these results, we performed a t-test on the accuracy rate
of participants. In Figure 34 we report the mean accuracy with standard deviation for all 8
tasks when using the Standard method vs. REM. Note that the accuracy rate was significant
in tasks Social1, Social4, Shopping1, and Shopping4 with a p-valuep < 0.05.
In a post survey, participants were asked to assess our proposed browser extension REM
and the Standard method using three Likert scale questions.Participants responded to
each of the following statements on a scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly
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Figure 33: Time distributions for correctly answered tasks
Task Standard (µ, σ) REM (µ, σ) p-value
Social1 (0.0, 0.0) (0.294, 0.469) 0.01003
Social2 (0.47, 0.51) (0.64, 0.49) 0.13469
Social3 (0.70, 0.469) (0.70, 0.469) 0.5
Social4 (0.11, 0.33) (0.41, 0.50) 0.02787
Shopping1 (0.0, 0.0) (0.41, 0.50) 0.002048
Shopping2 (0.235, 0.437) (0.352, 0.492) 0.16609
Shopping3 (0.176, 0.392) (0.235, 0.437) 0.33417
Shopping4 (0.235, 0.437) (0.58, 0.50) 0.014459
Figure 34: T-test Task Accuracy.
agree).
S1: I am satisfied with the tool
S2: I was able to easily identify the permissions requested by each third party Chrome
extension.
S3: I was confident in determining the permitted actions for installed third part Chrome
extensions.
Figure 35 illustrates the user responses using boxplots. The black band in the middle of
a box indicates the median. From the responses we observed that REM was rated signifi-
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cantly higher (p < 0.05) for all three statements.
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Figure 35: Summary of Likert-Scale user responses
CHAPTER 6: VISUALIZED-BASED AND ASSISTED POLICY ANALYSIS
Performing SELinux policy analyses can be difficult, due to the complexity of the policy
language and the sheer number of policy rules and attributesinvolved. For example, the
default policy on most SELinux-enabled systems, has over 1,500,000 flat rules, involving
over 1,780types. Simple analyses betweentypescan result in a large amount of data, which
is poorly presented to administrators in existing analysistools. Furthermore, administrators
are required to add new policy rules on a regular basis, whichcan potentially compromise
the security of a system, if the consequences of adding such rules are nfot well-understood.
We propose and implement a policy analysis tool “SEGrapher”that addresses the above
challenges. SEGrapher visually presents analysis resultsas a simplified directed graph,
where nodes aretypes, and edges are corresponding rules betweentypes. Graphs are gener-
ated via a proposed clustering algorithm that clusterstypesbased on their accesses. Clusters
provide an abstraction layer that removes undesired data, and focuses on analysis attributes
specified by the administrator. Furthermore, SEGrapher assists administrators in evaluating
the risks associated with custom policy modules, based on a proposed similarity approach
that analyzes new rules within these modules. Visual cues are also provided to notify ad-
ministrators of various levels of potential risks.
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6.1 Related Work
Well known SELinux policy analysis tools include APOL [67],SLAT [47], PAL [59],
and Gokyo [30]. Tresys Technology developed the APOL tool, which is used to analyze
SELinux policies. It provides a wide range of features including domain transition analysis,
direct and transitive information flow analysis, and type relationship analysis. APOL re-
quires a strong understanding of SELinux policies and the involved attributes, and requires
a fair set of skills to perform proper policy analyses. Results in APOL are text-based, and in
many cases unmanageable due to large result sets. SLAT (Security Enhanced Linux Anal-
ysis Tool) represents a policy as a directed graph, where nods are security-contexts and
edges as the permissions on certain object-classes. The focus of SLAT is on information
flow, which can be detected by traversing the policy graph. PAL (Policy Analysis using
Logic-Programming) uses a logic-programming approach foranalyzing SELinux policies.
It follows the same model as SLAT, but provides a more extensiv query set to admins.
Similar to SLAT, PAL does not provide visualized analysis reults, and is not able to dis-
cover inherent relations between multiple types, but is rather limited to answering direct
queries.Both SLAT and PAL require a strong understanding ofSELinux to generate strong
queries that result in meaningful results.
Jaeger et al. [30], developed a tool called Gokyo, mainly used for checking the integrity
of a proposed trusted computing base (TCB) for SELinux. Integrity checks ensure that no
types outside the TCB can write to types within the TCB, and notypes inside the TCB can
read from those outside of it. Gokyo uses a graphical access control model for representing
policies. Gokyo is limited to the proposed TCB and does not prvide “on the fly” policy
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analysis, nor does it allow admins to interact with the resulting analysis results.
Xu et al. [73], proposed a visualization-based policy analysis framework for analyzing se-
curity policies using semantic substrates and adjacency matrices. The framework allows
admins to run visualization-based queries on a policy base to find possible policy viola-
tions. However, their framework is limited to a small set of queries, and the visualization
results can be difficult to interpret and understand.
MITRE [48], developed the Polgen tool, which provides semi-automated policy generation
for new applications. It relies on observing an application’s system calls, and inferring a
new policy. Polgen is well suited for new applications, but could require long observations
to generate robust policies. Polgen doesn’t utilize existing policy decisions in inferring
the new policy. Existing decisions are a valuable source foridentifying appropriate new
policies.
6.2 SELinux Policy Analysis
Let T be the set off all types within a SELinux policyP , O the set of all object-classes,
andA the set of all permissions. We propose a policy analysis tool“SEGrapher” which
allows for visualizing policy analysis results, by modeling a policy as a directed graph.
Given a policyP , SEGrapher builds a directed graphGp, where a node inGp maps to a
specific SELinux type, and an edge (out-edge) maps to the set of all AV allow rules Rij
connecting a typeti (subject-type) to a typetj (object-type). Figure 36 illustrates a simple
graph of three types,t1 (subject-type),t2 (object-type), andt3 (object-type). The figure
shows the corresponding AV rulesR12 for t1 andt2 with two allow rules, andR13 for t1
andt3 with one allow rule.
104
t
1
t
2
allow t
1
 t
2
 : file { write}
allow t
1
 t
2
 : dir { read write}
R
12
t
3
allow t
1
 t
3
 : tcp_socket { listen }
R
13
Figure 36: Allow rules for subject-typet1 and object-typest2 andt3.
SEGrapher usesGp to generate a directed focus-graphGf representing desired analysis
results, that is,Gf will indicate the accesses and relations amongst SELinux types analyzed
by admins.Gf is driven by a set of inputs that are checked against AV rules (edges) inGp.
These inputs are controlled and provided by admins and include the following:
1. Focus TypesTf : A set of typesTf ⊆ T which is the focus of the policy analysis and
the basis of extracting the focus-graphGf from Gp. An out-edge inGp is added to
Gf if the source-node (subject-type) of this out-edge exists in Tf .
2. Focus Object-Classof : An object-classof ∈ O, which is used to filter the out-edges
that already satisfy the focus-typesTf . SEGrapher allows admins to ignore checking
for of , henceof will be replaceable by any object-class inO.
3. Focus PermissionsAf : A set of permissionsAf ⊆ A, which are used to further filter
the out-edges that already satisfy bothTf and the focus object-classof . SEGrapher
also allows admins to ignore checking forAf , henceAf will be equal toA.
With the providedTf , of , andAf , an out-edge inGp with an AV allow rule setRfn is added
toGf if for any ri ∈ Rfn the following conditions areall true:
1. The subject-type forri exists inTf .
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2. The object-class forri = of
3. Af exists within the permissions forri.
For example, letTf = {t1}, of = dir, andAf = {write}. When applying these inputs
onto the graph in Figure 36, a new focus-graphGf is generated as illustrated in Figure 37.
Note that, only out-edges with AV rule sets fulfilling the above conditions make it toGf .
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Figure 37: Filtered allow rules fort1 and object-typet2 as an edge inGf
With 1,517,130 AV allow rules, 1,785 types, 47 object-classes, and 167 different permis-
sions, the full SELinux reference policy graph is infeasible to analyze at once. Even when
applying the analysis inputsTf , of , andAf , a resulting focus-graphGf can be difficult to
analyze. In many cases, simply analyzing a single focus-type can result in a large number
of AV allow rules, hence a dense focus-graphGf . For example, to analyze ther ad ac-
cesses of the Samba Server [58] on directories within an SELinux-enabled Linux system,
let Tf = {smbd t}, of = {dir}, andAf = {read} wheresmbd_t is the subject-type (do-
main) corresponding to the Samba Server. This analysis results in 1,048 AV allow rules,
hence a denseGf of 1,048 edges and 1,049 nodes. If we add a second typef d_t (FTP
Server) toTf , and run a new analysis, we’ll find that the number of edges inGf almost
doubles to 2,095, leading to a very dense graph, whereas the number of nodes increases
just to 1,052. This is due to the fact that bothsmbd_t andftpd_t have a large overlap in
the object-types they access, i.e. their out-edges share a lge set of end nodes withinGf .
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Observation 1.Many subject-types in SELinux have a large overlap of object-types that
they access. In some cases they access the exact set of object-types, and in other cases there
is a hierarchical relation between the sets accessed.
Based on Observation 1, we define the following terms and relations between typesti
andtj in Tf :
Definition 8. (Object-Type Set) The object-type setToi ⊆ T for type ti is the set of
object-types in all AV allow rules, where an AV rule’s subject-type isti. That is, the set of
all types that i can access.
Definition 9. (Matching Types) Typesti andtj arematchingif their respective object-
type setsToi andToj are equal. Formally,
tiℜmtj ⇐⇒ (Toi = Toj )
Definition 10. (Hierarchical, Parent-Child Types) Aparent-childrelation between types
ti (parent) andtj (child) exists whenti’s object-type setToi is a proper superset oftj ’s
object-type setToj . Formally,
tiℜhtj ⇐⇒ (Toi ⊃ Toj )
Definition 11. (Overlapping Types) Typesti andtj are overlappingif their respective
object-type setsToi andToj overlap and neithertiℜmtj or tiℜhtj holds . Formally,
tiℜotj ⇐⇒ (Toi ∩ Toj 6= φ) ∧ tiℜmtj ∧ tiℜhtj
Definition 12. (Disjoint Types) Typesti andtj aredisjoint if their respective object-type
setsToi andToj are disjoint. Formally,
tiℜdtj ⇐⇒ (Toi ∩ Toj = φ)
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These relations can assist in discovering other interesting relations between typesti and
tj in Tf .
Note that our focus is not on one-to-one type relations, i.e.canti ∈ Tf accesstj ∈ Tf ,
but on more interesting relations that exist betweenti andtj which can eventually lead to
simpler policy configurations and an easier analysis process. One-to-one relations between
ti andtj can still easily be identified from the relations above. In SEGrapher we uniquely
visualize the focus-typesTf , this makes it easy to identify them and to identify any one-to-
one relations that may exist between them.
Based on the defined relationsℜm,ℜh,ℜo, andℜd, and our higher goal of discovering new
relations, we propose a clustering algorithm in section 6.2.1 that utilizes and exposes exist-
ing relations between types inTf . By exposing these relations and building a cluster-based
focus-graph reflecting these relations, the algorithm is able to visually simplify focus-
graphs, hence simplify the policy analysis process.
6.2.1 Type Clustering
We propose and implement a clustering algorithm that utilizes the relationsℜm,ℜh,ℜo,
andℜd identified above. Given focus-typesTf , object-classof , permissionsAf , and an
edge-reduction thresholdτe, we extract existing relations from a policy graphGp and gen-
erate a set of clustersC where each clusterCi ∈ C becomes a node within a new cluster-
based focus-graphGf .
The process of generatingGf is detailed in Algorithm 1. The algorithm starts by initial-
izing a set of cluster nodes from the object-type sets of the focus-typesTf . Lines 3 and 4
create a new cluster nodeCc for each of the focus-typestf ∈ Tf , and a new edge between
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Algorithm 1: Generate Clustered Policy Focus-Graph
input : Policy graphGp, focus-typesTf , object-classof , permissionsAf , and
thresholdτe
output: Clustered Focus-GraphGf
1 Initialization:C ← {} ; // Candidate Cluster Nodes
2 foreach tf ∈ Tf do
3 create new cluster nodeCc;
4 add edgee(tf , Cc) toGf ;
5 foreach nodetn ∈ OutNodes(tf , Gp) do
6 Rfn = AV allow rule for edgee(tf , tn) in Gp;
7 if Rfn satisfiesof andAf then
8 add edgee(Cc, tn) toGf ;
9 insertCc intoC;
10 while optimization possibledo
11 for i← 0 to size(C) do
12 for j ← 0 to size(C) do
13 outnodesi = OutNodes(Ci, Gf);
14 outnodesj = OutNodes(Cj, Gf);
15 if outnodesi = outnodesj then
16 MergeMatching(Ci, Cj, Gf);
17 else ifoutnodesi ⊂ outnodesj then
18 MergeSuperset(Ci, Cj, τe, Gf);
19 else ifoutnodesj ⊂ outnodesi then
20 MergeSuperset(Cj, Ci, τe, Gf);
21 else ifoutnodesi ∩ outnodesj 6= φ then
22 MergeOverlap(Ci, Cj, τe, Gf);
tf andCc is added toGf . On lines 6 and 7, the AV allow rule corresponding to each edge
betweentf and its out-nodes inGp is evaluated against the givenof andAf . If of is the
same as the AV rule’s object-class, andAf is within the AV rule’s permissions, then a new
edge from the new clusterCc and the out-node is created inGf . Each new cluster is then
stored intoC, at line 9. Figure 38 shows an example of the initialization process (assuming
all AV rules are satisfyof andAf ).
Lines 11 to 22 of Algorithm 1, involve discovering potentialre ations between pairs of
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Figure 38: Initialization of new node clusters for focus-typest1 andt2
focus-types, where each focus-type is represented by its corresponding cluster from the
initialization phase, that is, each cluster represents a type’s object-type set. At line 15 of
Algorithm 1, it checks if the relationℜm holds. In this scenario, Algorithm 2 is used to
merge the object-type sets into one set. Figure 39 illustrates this process. Note that the
number of both clusters and edges decreases, hence simplifying the resultingGf .
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Figure 39: Clusters with matching object-types
Algorithm 2: MergeMatching
input : Cluster NodesC1 & C2. Focus-GraphGf
1 foreachedgee(t, C1) ∈ Gf do
2 add edgee(t, C2) to Gf ;
3 remove edge(t, C1) from Gf ;
4 removeC1 from C
At lines 17 and 19 of Algorithm 1, it checks if the relationℜh holds. In this scenario,
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Algorithm 3 is used to establish a parent-child relationship w thin Gf . This is achieved
by removing the out-edges of a parent cluster that point to the object-type set of the child
cluster, then pointing the parent cluster to the child cluster. Figure 40 illustrates this pro-
cess. Note that the edge-reduction thresholdτe is passed to Algorithm 3, which allows it to
measure the feasibility of establishing the parent-child re ation. That is, before Algorithm
3 makes any changes toGf , it checks if the resulting reduction in edge numbers is greater
thanτe. The edge reduction for anℜh relation is equal to (the number of out-edges of the
child cluster – 1).
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Figure 40: Clusters with superset object-types (parent-child)
Algorithm 3: MergeSuperset
input : Cluster NodesC1 & C2. Thresholdτe, and Focus-GraphGf
1 if C1 andC2 satisfyτe then
2 To ← OutNodes (C1, Gf );
3 foreach nodetn ∈ To do
4 remove edge(C2, tn) fromGf ;
5 add edgee(C2, C1) to Gf ;
At line 21 of Algorithm 1, it checks if the relationℜo holds. In this case, Algorithm 4
is used to extract the overlapping object-types, and creates a new cluster that points to the
overlap. Figure 42 illustrates this scenario. The edge-reduction thresholdτe is passed to
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Algorithm 4, which allows it to measure the feasibility of establishing theℜo relation. That
is, before Algorithm 4 makes any changes toGf , it checks if the resulting reduction in edge
numbers is greater thanτe. The edge reduction for anℜo relation is equal to (the number
of overlapping out-edges – 2). Also note that for this scenario, the number of clusters
increases by 1. In our implementation, we find that the increase of clusters for a reasonable
edge-reductionτe, is effective from a visualization point of view.
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Figure 41: Clusters with overlapping object-types
Algorithm 4: MergeOverlap
input : Candidate ClustersC1, C2, and thresholdτe
1 if C1 andC2 satisfyτe then
2 create new cluster nodeCo;
3 To ← OutNodes (C1, Gf ) ∩ OutNodes (C2, Gf );
4 foreach nodetn ∈ To do
5 add edgee(Co, tn) toGf ;
6 remove edge(C1, tn) fromGf ;
7 remove edge(C2, tn) fromGf ;
8 add edgee(C1, Co) toGf ;
9 add edgee(C2, Co) toGf ;
Algorithm 1 continues to run until no more feasible relations are discoverable.
The results from applying Algorithm 1 are effective in both discovering interesting rela-
tions between focus-types, and in simplifying the visualization of analysis results.
112
6.3 Assisted Policy Analysis
Providing clustered visual analysis results to admins allows for a clearer understanding
of existing type relations, and provides a layer of abstraction hat isolates unnecessary
analysis data, hence focusing on types that matter the most.But, admins do not only
deal with existing policy rules, but are also required to addnew rules for certain types
on a regular basis. This occurs when a certain service Addingnew rules can potentially
involve risks of compromising the security of a system, either by adding rules that are too
permissive, or by adding rules that are completely unnecessary [54, 74]. It is important to
provide a mechanism that analyzes the risks associated withintroducing new policy rules.
We propose an assisted analysis mechanism that is part of SEGrapher. The proposed
mechanism provides analysis data on newly introduced rules, which can guide the admins
in making better policy management decisions.
6.3.1 Similarity-Based Model
Let Rnew be the set of new AV allow rules for an existing typeti, andRold the set of
all existing AV rules for all existing typesT in the policyP . Our approach determines a
set of similar typesTs ∈ T , based on the existing rules forti. To measure the similarity
between types, we construct afeature-vectorfor each typeti ∈ T , based on its accesses in
P . To capture the accesses of each type inT , we generate two types of access-matrices,
each capturing different levels of granularity.
1. MT : A matrix that captures the accesses between each pair of types(ti, tj) ∈ T ×T ,
regardless of the object-classes or permissions involved.An entryeij ∈MT indicates
whetherti is allowed (eij = 1) or denied (eij = 0) access totj. That is, if there exists
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Figure 42: Feature Vectors
a ruleri ∈ Rold that allowsti access totj, theneij = 1, regardless of the object-class
or permissions for i. Figure 42(a) illustrates theMT access-matrix forP .
2. MTO: A matrix that captures the accesses between a typeti ∈ T and pairs(tj, ok) ∈
T × O , whereO is the set of all object-classes inP . These accesses are regardless
of the permissions involved. An entryeijk ∈ MTO indicates whetherti is allowed
(eijk = 1) or denied (eijk = 0) access totj given the object-classok. That is, if there
exists a ruleri ∈ Rold that allowsti access totj , and its object-class is equal took,
theneijk = 1, regardless of the permissions forri. Figure 42(b) illustrates theMTO
access-matrix forP .
Based on the access-matricesMT , andMTO, we define the feature-vectorsVT , andVTO
respectively. Each feature-vector on a typeti is represented by theith row of its respective
access-matrix. For example, the typet1 has two feature-vectors:VT1 (1st row ofMT ), and
VTO1 (1st row ofMTO).
The similarity between any two typesti and tj is based on how similar their feature-
vectors are, e.g. types that have identical accesses withinP , will have identical feature-
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vectors. To calculate the similaritysim(ti, tj), we use the Pearson correlation coefficient
which is widely used for similarity measures [25, 45].sim(ti, tj) represents the similarity
between the feature-vectors ofti andtj . Equation 7 shows the Pearson correlation simi-
larity value betweenti andtj , using their correspondingVT feature-vectors. The value of
sim(ti, tj) is between−1 and1, where a−1 indicates a reverse correlation, a1 indicates a
perfect correlation, and0 indicates no correlation. Types with a Pearson correlationcoeffi-
cient value closest to1 are the most similar, and are referred to as thenearest-neighbors.
sim(ti, tj) =
∑n
k=1(VTik − VTi)(VTjk − VTj )
√
∑n
k=1(VTik − VTi)
2
√
∑n
k=1(VTjk − VTj)
2
(7)
SEGrapher determines the nearest-neighbors for typeti of the newly introduced rulesRnew,
by applying two stages of filtering:
1. Stage 1: At this stage, SEGrapher calculates the similarity valuessim(ti, tj) based
on feature-vectors of typeVT , which only takes type-to-type accesses into consider-
ation, and disregards object-classes. Once similarity values are calculated, nearest-
neighbors are selected such that theirsim(ti, tj) value is larger than the thresholdτ1,
which is set by admins within SEGrapher.
2. Stage 2: LetTn be the set of nearest-neighbor types resulting from Stage 1.SEGra-
pher generates a newMTO matrix based only onTn rather thanT . Similarity values
sim(ti, tj) are then calculated based on the feature-vectorsVTO from the newMTO.
Tn is then filtered to only contain types with asim(ti, tj) value larger than the thresh-
old τ2, which is also set by admins within SEGrapher.
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6.3.2 Nearest-Neighbor Rule Classification
After applying our similarity model onto the subject-typeti of the new rulesRnew, we
are able to identify the nearest-neighbors setTn. Types inTn have similar accesses to
ti, and are used as a measure of how risky the rulesRnew are, compared to the nearest-
neighbors’ rulesRn. That is, rulesRnew could be considered safe if the admin observes
similar rules inRn. SEGrapher allows admins to easily observe rules inRn by classifying
them into different access-classes based on the object-typesTnew, object-classesOnew, and
permissionsAnew accessed within the rules ofRnew.
For a rulerj ∈ Rn, let tj be its object-type,on its object-class, andAn its permissions. We
define the following access-classes onrj:
• Non-Matching: Rulerj belongs to this class iftj /∈ Tnew, on /∈ Onew, or An 6⊂
Anew. This class is considered the strongest notification of potential risks. SEGrapher
visually highlights these rules in red color, to grasp the admin’s attention.
• Less Permissive: Rulerj belongs to this class iftj ∈ Tnew, on ∈ Onew, andAn ⊂
Anew. This class is also a strong notification of potential risks,because there are
shared accesses, but not as permissive as rules inRnew. This class is visually high-
lighted in orange color.
• Overlapping: Rulerj belongs to this class iftj ∈ Tnew, on ∈ Onew, andAn∩Anew 6=
φ. This is also considered a strong notification of potential risks, because there are
shared accesses, but not the same as rules inRnew. This class is visually highlighted
in yellow color.
• More Permissive: Rulerj belongs to this class iftj ∈ Tnew, on ∈ Onew, andAnew ⊂
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An. Rules in this class are more permissive thanRnew, which indicates that rules of
Rnew are potentially less risky. These are highlighted in green.
• Matching: Rulerj belongs to this class iftj ∈ Tnew, on ∈ Onew, andAnew =
An. This class reflects rules with identical accesses to those of Rnew. These are
highlighted in green color.
6.4 Design and Implementation
We implement our proposed clustering algorithm and assisted custom policy analysis
module in a tool we call “SEGrapher”. SEGrapher is based on the Java JDK 1.6, and uses
the APIs provided by SETools [68] for parsing SELinux policies. Its graph drawing is
based on an extended version of the open source visualization toolkit Prefuse [31].
6.4.1 Visualization and Interactivity
SEGrapher’s GUI as shown in Figure 43, contains two main panels. First, the left panel
which allows the admin to control the analysis attributes, such as focus-types, object-
classes, and permissions. It also has the controls for starting the analysis, and searching
for types within resulting focus-graphs. Second, a right panel which shows the resulting
focus-graphs of the analysis. The right panel is also where the results of an assisted-policy
analysis appears.
6.4.2 Focus-Graphs
The components of a focus-graph are visually differentiated to provide for easier policy
analysis.
• Focus-type Nodes: Focus-types are shown as green nodes within the graph. SEGra-
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Figure 43: SEGrapher Interface
pher also creates a new version of a focus-type in cases whereit also plays the role
of an object-type. The reasoning behind this is to provide a simpler focus-graph with
less cycles, in cases where focus-types access other focus-type .
• Object-type Nodes: Object-types are shown as orange nodes in the focus-graph.
Object-type nodes are hidden by default, as they are not the focus of the analysis.
In cases where an object-type is also one of the focus-types,it is by default expanded
and visible.
• Cluster Nodes: The proposed clustering approach in Section6.2.1 results in cluster
nodes that become part of the focus-graph. A cluster node is shown in black color,
and shows a label which indicates the number of object-type nodes it points to. Ad-
mins can also expand/hide object-type nodes for a cluster node, by double-clicking
on the cluster node. Figure 44 shows the cluster nodeC1_0with 13 expanded object-
type nodes.
118
!
Figure 44: Overlapping relation (httpdconfig t ℜo httpd cachet)
An out-edge from a nodeni tonj indicates thatni can access the typenj (for the specified
object-classes and permissions). Ifnj is a cluster node, theni can access all the object-
type nodes for the cluster nodenj, and all object-type nodes for clusters pointed to bynj .
For example, in Figure 45, the typehttpd_t can access all object-type nodes for cluster
C1 andC0, whereas the typehttpd_tmp_t can only access nodes ofC0. Note that edges
between clusters are visually differentiated as a dashed lin .
Figure 45: Hierarchical relation (httpdt ℜh httpd tmp t)
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6.4.3 Policy Analysis
To start a policy analysis, first, the admin loads a policy into SEGrapher, which is then
parsed into a graph and stored into memory for future analysis. Second, the admin needs
to select a set of focus-types to be analyzed, and can optionally select which object-class,
and permissions to be used for filtering policy AV rules. The left panel of SEGrapher, as
seen in Figure 43, shows some of the object-classes and permissions provided.
Focus-Types SEGrapher allows admins to select a set of focus-type from a set of profiles
we define. These profiles allow for a more intuitive method of selecting types according to
their functionality, rather than searching for a specific type from within a large list of types
(e.g. SELinux targeted-policy has over 1,780 types). For example, an admin can easily
find the typehttpd_t within the profileApachewhich itself is within the profileServers.
Other profile examples includeDatabases, Mail, Introsion Detection, etc. Figure 43 shows
some of the profiles SEGrapher provides.
Once the admin decides on the analysis attributes, she/he can start the analysis. Follow-
ing our proposed clustering algorithm in Section 6.2.1, SEGrapher produces a focus-graph
reflecting the analysis results.
Figure 45 shows a focus-graph for focus-typeshttpd_t andhttpd_tmp_t. This
focus-graph illustrates a hierarchical relation (httpd_t ℜh {httpd_tmp_t), that is,
httpd_t has access to all object-types that{httpd_tmp_t has access to. This is re-
flected through the cluster nodesC1 andC0, wherehttpd_t points toC1 which in turn
points toC0, whereas{httpd_tmp_t only points toC0.
Another example of a focus-graph is shown in Figure 44, whichshows an overlapping
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relation (httpd_config_t ℜo httpd_cache_t). The overlapping accesses between
httpd_config_t andhttpd_cache_t are clearly captured within the clusterC1_0.
6.4.4 Assisted Policy Analysis
SEGrapher provides admins the ability to load their own custom policy modules. These
modules can either be ones resulting from a tool such as audit2allow [32], or manually
written by admins themselves and loaded as a text file. Once a custom module is loaded,
SEGrapher analyzes the new AV allow rules within the module,and applies our proposed
assisted policy analysis approach in Section 6.3. Considerthe following AV rule within a
loaded custom module:
allow httpd_t user_home_t : dir {write}
For this rule, SEGrapher will first, find the nearest-neighbors types forhttpd_t, using our
approach in Subsection 6.3.1, and based on the nearest-neighbors’ thresholdsτ1 andτ2 that
are set by the admin. The nearest-neighbors’ rules are then classified into their appropriate
access-classes. Figure 46 shows the resulting nearest-neighbors’ rules classifications, with
their corresponding color-codes. Note that the rule with subject-typemysqld_t shows a
strong potential risk of adding the new suggested rule, whereas the last rule in the figure
shows low risk. Finally, SEGrapher generates the focus-graph for the types involved in
Figure 46: Assisted policy analysis results. Classification of existing rules.
the new custom module, in this case the typeshttpd_t anduser_home_t as shown in
Figure 43.
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6.5 User Study
In order to evaluate the effectiveness and usability of SEGrapher we conducted a user
study comparing it to the de-facto SELinux policy analysis tool “APOL”. Participants in the
study go through a number of tasks related to SELinux policy analysis, and then complete
a questionnaire on these tasks. The study was approved by UNC-Charlotte IRB (Protocol
#12-05-18).
6.5.1 Methodology
The study participants were recruited from UNC-Charlotte and other corporations. They
included both graduate students and IT professionals. We recruit d a total of 19 participants
who all successfully completed the study and the accompanying survey. Of the partici-
pants, 63.1% were in the Information Security field, 15.8% were specialized in Computer
Networking, 5.3% in Computer Graphics & Visualization, and15.7% from other fields.
5.26% of the participants change their operating system configuration on a daily basis,
15.8% weekly, 47.4% monthly, and 26.3% never. 10.5% of them configure their operating
system security policy on a weekly basis, 52.6% monthly, whereas 36.8% never do so. Par-
ticipants where given an introduction to both APOL and SEGrapher and were familiarized
with their user interfaces. We then performed a within-subjects study comparison in which
participants go through a number of policy analysis tasks using both tools. The order of
using each tool was randomized and counter balanced.
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6.5.1.1 Policy Analysis Tasks
The analysis tasks in the study involved 6 main tasks as seen in Figure 47. The tasks were
performed both on APOL and SEGrapher. The target SELinux policy that was analyzed
was the SELinux reference policy in targeted mode.
Analysis Task
Browse the policy components (types, object classes, and permissions).
Locate types belonging to Apache.
Identify the rules betweenhttpd t andftpd t.
Identify if the typehttpd t haswrite permission onftpd t.
Identify relations between the set of types accessed byhttpd t andhttpd tmp t.
Identify the policy rules amonghttpd t, mysqld t, andpostgresql t.
Figure 47: Policy Analysis Tasks
6.5.2 Study Results
After completing the analysis tasks, the participants wereasked to complete a question-
naire which covered 5 main aspects of using APOL and SEGraphe. The 5 aspects in-
clude:Ease of Use, Overall Satisfaction, Browsing Policy Components, Composing Analy-
sis Queries, and finallyPolicy Type Interconnectivity. For each of the aspects we perform a
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (paired by participant and p< 0.05) to observe the significance
of using SEGrapher vs. APOL. The results are summarized in Figure 48.
APOL (µ, σ) SEGrapher (µ, σ) p-value
Ease of Use (2.736, 0.871) (4.578, 0.507) 0.00001526
Overall Satisfaction (2.84, 0.95) (4.63, 0.59) 0.00001526
Browsing Policy Components (2.89, 1.19) (4.47, 0.51) 0.0003662
Composing Analysis Queries (2.736, 0.933) (4.57, 0.692) 0.01562
Policy Type Interconnectivity (2.89, 1.19) (4.47, 0.51) 0.00001526
Figure 48: SEGrapher vs. APOL
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6.5.2.1 Ease of Use
Participants were asked to rank the ease of using each of APOLand SEGrapher using
a Likert Scale from 1 to 5, where 1 isVery Complicatedand 5 isVery Easy. We observed
that SEGrapher was ranked significantly higher than APOL with (Z=-3.79, p=0.00001526,
r=0.614).
6.5.2.2 Overall Satisfaction
Participants ranked their overall satisfaction of APOL andSEGrapher using a Likert
Scale from 1 to 5, where 1 isStrongly Disagreeand 5 isStrongly Agree. We observed that
SEGrapher was ranked significantly higher than APOL in user satisfaction with (Z=-3.8,
p=0.00001526, r=0.616).
6.5.2.3 Browsing Policy Components
Participants ranked their satisfaction with browsing the policy components on APOL
and SEGrapher using a Likert Scale from 1 to 5, where 1 isStrongly Disagreeand 5 is
Strongly Agree. We observed that SEGrapher was ranked significantly higherthan APOL
with (Z=-3.3779, p=0.0003662, r=0.547).
6.5.2.4 Composing Analysis Queries
Participants ranked their satisfaction with composing analysis queries within APOL and
SEGrapher using a Likert Scale from 1 to 5, where 1 isStrongly Disagreeand 5 isStrongly
Agree. We observed that SEGrapher was ranked significantly higherthan APOL with (Z=-
3.7376, p=0.0000305, r=0.606).
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6.5.2.5 Policy Type Interconnectivity
Participants ranked their satisfaction with identifying policy type interconnections using
APOL and SEGrapher on a Likert Scale from 1 to 5, where 1 isStrongly Disagreeand 5 is
Strongly Agree. We observed that SEGrapher was ranked significantly higherthan APOL
with (Z=-3.796, p=0.00001526, r=0.615).
6.5.3 Assisted Policy Analysis
Participants also went through 3 tasks related to SEGrapher’s assisted policy analysis
module. These tasks are listed in Figure 49. From these taskswe evaluate the partici-
pants’ satisfaction level with SEGrapher’s assisted policy analysis module’sease of use,
presentation, resulting statistics, andresulting risk analysis graph. Participants rate their
satisfaction with each aspect on a Likert scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly disagree
and 5 is strongly agree. Figures 50(a) and 50(b) illustrate the responses using boxplots. In
summary participants were overall satisfied with the various elements in the assisted policy
module.
Analysis Task
Identify the existing policy rules similar to the new ones.
Identify the number ofNon-Matching, Less Permissive, Overlapping, More Permissive,
andMatchingpolicy rules.
Identify the overall risk of adding the new rules.
Figure 49: Assisted Policy Analysis Tasks
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Statistics Graph
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5
(a) Satisfaction with resulting statistics
and analysis graph
Presentation Ease of Use
1
2
3
4
5
(b) Satisfaction with presentation and
overall ease of use
Figure 50: Summary of Likert scale responses
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
This chapter reiterates and clearly defines the contributions of this dissertation work, and
also discusses potential future paths for extending upon this research.
7.1 Contributions
In this work we have proposed and implemented a set of policy management frame-
works which are motivated by the need to guide and enhance theoverall policy manage-
ment process. The frameworks are mainly based on two techniques: recommendations and
clustering.
First, we propose an enhanced version of the Sun PDP engine which improved policy
evaluation performance by orders of magnitude. This was posible by analyzing previous
access control request data, and the policy structure. We then adapted the policy to suit
various scenarios of high access control requests.
Second, a recommendation-based open authorization framework that was incorporated
within a browser (Chrome and Firefox) extension called FBSecur . The framework extends
upon the existing OAuth mechanism and provided the following: 1) Recommendations per
requested permissions, which are based on the collaborative community decisions, 2) Fine-
grained control over the privacy attributes requested by third party applications.
Third, we propose a framework for guiding users towards enhancing their policy deci-
sions on third party browser extension permissions. The framework provides fine-grained
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controls over the requested permissions in addition to extended permission descriptions.
We conducted a user-study to evaluate the effectiveness of the framework, which showed
a significant improvement in the user awareness towards the permissions requested by ex-
tensions. The framework is also capable of monitoring the accesses made by third party
extensions at run-time.
Finally, we propose “SEGrapher”, a visualized-based policy analysis tool for SELinux
policies. SEGrapher uses a clustering technique that clusters SELinuxtypesbased on their
policy accesses. Using these clusters it is able to present simplified analyses results in
the form of a directed graph. The cluster-based results provide a powerful approach for
discovering inherited relations between various SELinux policy types. SEGrapher also has
the ability to measure the potential risks of adding new policy rules. The risks are based on
previous knowledge of the policy and discovering the similarit es between the types in the
new rules and those already within the policy.
7.2 Future Work
This dissertation contributes a number of frameworks for enhancing the policy manage-
ment process for both administrators and users. In the following we discuss future work
that could further improve upon this research.
7.2.1 Recommendation-based Open Authorization
The proposed recommendation-based open authorization canfurther be integrated with
existing social networking sites. This integration can enrich the recommendation models
by utilizing extended user data (e.g. profile information and friendship network). This
would also reduce the effect of cold start recommendations.A other potential path would
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involve incorporating the functionalities of the framework directly into the browser and
adopt a wider range of social sites. Further user studies would verify the effectiveness of
such integration.
7.2.2 Third Party Browser Extension Policy Management
The current state of the framework allows for fine-grained permission controls and run-
time monitoring of extension accesses. To further improve the framework, recommendation
models such as those in Section 4 should be adopted. Next to the permission descriptions
provided in the framework, users would also be able to utilize recommendations based on
the community inputs.
The monitoring of extension accesses was mainly based on Chrome API calls. Accesses
out of the Chrome API scope could still possibly occur. To mitiga e the possibility of so,
additional methods of detecting extension access should bea opted, e.g. static analysis of
extension source code could potentially help, in addition to identifying certain attack paths
or unsafe javascript methods.
As Chrome extensions already have a dedicated settings windo within Chrome itself,
it would be interesting to study the potential integration of the framework into Chrome’s
existing settings window rather than being a stand alone extnsion. This could change the
users perception towards customizing permissions and enhance their experience.
7.2.3 SELinux Policy Management
The proposed tool “SEGrapher” can be further improved by adding better user interac-
tion capabilities with the resulting analysis graphs. Suchinteractions could provide faster
feedback on specific relations amongst the analyzed policy types. For example, clicking on
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an edge could provide extra details on a relationship.
The risk analysis module within SEGrapher could be extend upon to accommodate new
types that do not already exist within the policy. This mightrequire some additional infor-
mation to be provided by the administrator in an effort to better understand the new types.
SEGrapher could provide a set of usage profiles that can be assigned to newly introduced
rules and from those profiles infer possible recommendations. Such profiles could be gen-
erated by analyzing and monitoring the behaviors of different applications within various
domains. For example, a profile could be generated for we servers in general, hence any
new rules that are assigned to a web server could potentiallybe compared to its associated
profile. Finally, additional user studies could be conducted to further evaluate the effective-
ness of SEGrapher.
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